A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decision-Making in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes by Seidenfeld, Mark
Florida State University College of Law
Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
1994
A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decision-Making in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes
Mark Seidenfeld
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decision-Making in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 Tex.
L. Rev. 83 (1994),
Available at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/4
? ???? ?????
Citation: 73 Tex. L. Rev.  83 1994-1995 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Feb 24 10:25:02 2015
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0040-4411
A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes
Mark Seidenfeld*
Although traditionally courts have had primary and ultimate authority for inter-
preting statutes, the Supreme Court established a two-step review process that is much
more deferential to a government agency's interpretation. Under the "Chevron two-
step," a court determines whether the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
issue decided by the agency; if so, the court defers to the agency's interpretation unless
it is unreasonable. The first step, which looks to whether the statute is silent or
ambiguous, proves determinative in most cases; courts infrequently conclude at step
two that agencies' interpretations are unreasonable.
Professor Seidenfeld argues that the current application of Chevron fails to
accord with public policy. He contends that the pluralistic democracy model, which
implicitly undergirds Chevron, is flawed, and he offers deliberative democracy as a
more satisfactory conception of bureaucratic government. Professor Seidenfeld asserts
that deliberative democracy suggests a modification of Chevron which would place the
emphasis on the second rather than the first Chevron step, thereby forcing agencies to
explain why their interpretations are good policy in light of the purposes and concerns
underlying the statutory scheme. Thus, Professor Seidenfeld advocates a "syncopated
Chevron" as an improved approach to reviewing agencies' interpretations of the
statutes they administer.
A decade has now passed since the Supreme Court decided Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 Chevron
established a two-step approach for judicial review of agencies' interpreta-
tions of statutes they administer: First, the reviewing court determines
whether the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise
question decided by the agency.2 Second, if the court finds that the statute
is silent or ambiguous, it defers to the agency interpretation unless that
* Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. B.A. 1975, Reed College; M.A.
1979, Brandeis University; J.D. 1983, Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Rob Atkinson, Dan
Gifford, Adam Hirsch, Ron Levin, Jim Rossi, and Jean Sternlight, whose insightful comments on ear-
lier drafts greatly improved this Article, and Tammi Berden, whose dedicated research made writing
this Article so much easier.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 842.
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interpretation is wholly unreasonable.' The Chevron "two-step" 4 has
revolutionized judicial review of agency statutory interpretation.' In
applying Chevron, courts have emphasized the step-one inquiry-determin-
ing whether a statute has spoken to the precise question.6 At step two,
few courts have applied exacting scrutiny in assessing the reasonableness
of an agency interpretation.'
Scholars have written a plethora of articles about the significance of
Chevron for administrative law.' Some have addressed the pragmatics of
3. Id. at 843-44.
4. Apparently, Judge Kenneth Starr coined the phrase "Chevron two-step." See Panel Discussion,
Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 353,360 (1987)
(comments of Judge Kenneth Starr) ("Thus was born-or 're-announced,' for those who believe that
Chevron signaled no change whatsoever in the way we go about our business-the 'Chevron two-
step.'"); see also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-ChevronEra, 3 YALEJ. ON REo. 283,
287-88 (1986) (describing the "Supreme Court's Two-Step Framework").
5. The Supreme Court has applied Chevron in about only one-third of the cases in which the Court
has addressed agency interpretations of statutes. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969, 982 (1992) (reporting an empirical study of Supreme Court
cases dealing with deference to administrative interpretations demonstrating that from 1984 to 1990 one-
third applied the Chevron framework, and from 1987 to 1990 one-half applied the framework). Al-
though this has led some commentators to question whether Chevron represents the revolution in
administrative law that many have proclaimed, id. at 980; see also Gary J. Edles, Has Steelworkers
Burst Chevron's Bubble? Some Practical Implications of Judicial Deference, 10 R v. LrTO. 695, 700
(1991) (discussing the Court's retreat from Chevron deference); Russel L. Weaver, Some Realism About
Chevron, 58 Mo. L. REV. 129, 129-31 (1993) (asserting that "Chevron's importance has been
exaggerated"), the lower courts' consistent application probably has a greater day-to-day impact on the
administrative operation of the state, see KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1
ADMINISTRATIE LAW TREATISE § 3.2, at 110 (3d ed. 1994) ("Chevron is one of the most important
decisions in the history of administrative law. It has been cited and. applied in over 1,000 cases in the
last decade."). Hence, I adhere to the view that Chevron marked a major change in administrative law.
This is supported by empirical data concerning the effect of Chevron on outcomes in cases involving
lower court review of agency decisions. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the
Chevron Puzzle, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65, 105 (noting that Chevron signaled to
lower courts the Supreme Court's desire to allow greater agency discretion and that data from as
recently as 1990 suggests that the Court has not. called for an adjustment in the greater level of agency
discretion called for by Chevron); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1029-36 (presenting "strong
evidence" that, at least initially, Chevron increased affirmances, reduced reversals, and reduced
substantive law remands of agency interpretations by appellate courts).
6. E.g., Almero v. INS, 18 F.3d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1994); American Dental Ass'n v. Shalala,
3 F.3d 445, 446-48 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see Gregory G. Garre, CERCLA, Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, and the D.C. Circuit's Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations Under Chevron, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 932, 953 (1990) ("Chevron step one ... has become the 'primary battleground'
on which challenges to agency statutory interpretations are fought."); Merrill, supra note 5, at 990 ("In
short, under the two-step Chevron framework, everything turns on the theory ofjudicial interpretation
adopted at step one.").
7. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; cf. David Slawson, Legislative History and the
Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 406 (1992)
(noting that courts rarely determine that an agency's interpretation of legislative history is unreason-
able).
8. E.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation andthe Balance ofPower in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 456 (1989) (arguing that Chevron makes "ffundamental alterations...
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how the Chevron doctrine does or should operate: At what level of general-
ity does a court probe when determining whether a statute is ambiguous?9
What tools of statutory interpretation may the court use in making this
determination?" How aggressively does Chevron allow a reviewing court
to question the reasonableness of the agency interpretation if the statute is
ambiguous? To which issues of statutory interpretation should courts
apply Chevron?2 Others have addressed more theoretical concerns such
as the justification for judicial deference to the executive branch's
interpretation of statutes-a matter traditionally believed to fall within the
in our constitutional conception of the administrative state"); Merrill, supra note 5, at 980-93 (arguing
that the Supreme Court has not consistently applied the Chevron framework); Panel Discussion, supra
note 4, at 300-01 (comments of Judge Kenneth Starr) (arguing that "Chevron strongly suggests that
courts should see themselves not as supervisors of agencies, but more as a check or bulwark against
abuses of agency power"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 301-13 (1988) (detailing the
dramatic effect of Chevron on the courts); Schuck & Elliot, supra note 5, at 1029-41 (reporting an
empirical study indicating that Chevron had a significant effect on the outcomes of appellate court
reviews of agency interpretations, although noting that this effect has since weakened).
9. See, e.g., Edles, supra note 5, at 711 ("lA]t times, even the staunchest advocates of a strong
reading of Chevron must go behind the words of a statute to discern congressional purpose."); Panel
Discussion, Developments in JudicialReview with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing andDeference
to the Agency, 4 ADMIN. LJ. 113, 124-25 (1990) (comments of Judge Stephen Williams) (interpreting
Chevron as allowing a court to consider legislative history and "congressional assertions of policy
values" in deciding whether Congress has addressed the issue in question); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2091-93 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme
Court does not allow ambiguity to trigger judicial deference when the agency interpretation conflicts
with legislative instructions).
10. See, e.g., Edles, supra note 5, at 711; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.-511, 515, 521; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 2105-19 (all discuss-
ing the use of traditional interpretation tools after Chevron). This inquiry stems from the Supreme
Court's opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), in which Justice Stevens explicitly
"[e]mploy[ed] traditional tools of statutory construction" to overrule an Attorney General interpretation
of a provision of the Immigration and Nationalization Act. Id. at 446. Justice Scalia wrote separately
to object that the use of traditional tools to determine statutory meaning prior to invoking deference
would eviscerate Chevron. Id. at 453-55 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 9, at 124 (comments of Judge Stephen Williams)
(arguing that Chevron does not transfer the duty of statutory construction from the courts to the
agencies); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 2104-05 (arguing that agencies have latitude, not license, when
interpreting statutes). For the most thorough judicial exploration of this issue, see Continental Air
Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (concluding that
"'[r]easonableness' in this context means.., the compatibility of the agency's interpretation with the
policy goals ... or objectives of Congress").
12. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REo. 1, 3-5 (1990) (questioning whether and when courts should defer to
agency interpretations made in informal formats); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating
Interpreting andLawnaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187,232-33 (1992) (asserting that
courts should defer to an agency's interpretation only when the agency decision involves delegated
lawmaking rather than interpreting congressional meaning); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 2093-2104
(discussing the propriety of Chevron deference in various situations, including when the interpretation
is not part of a legislative rule format, when it involves law-applying rather than law-declaring, and
when it involves issues of agency jurisdiction).
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judiciary's unique province.13 How does Chevron accord with our present
understandings of separation of powers?"
This Article approaches Chevron by trying to place the decision within
the panoply of political theories that have appeared over the past century
to justify the vast discretion granted to administrative agencies.5 It
suggests that Chevron represents the judiciary's clearest departure from
traditional theories that view the administrative state as a means of imple-
menting the legislature's will. It demonstrates that Chevron is best
understood from the perspective that sees agencies as an expedient means
of reaching a political equilibrium or compromise on controversial regula-
tory issues-that is, a "pluralistic" view of agency decisionmaking. 6 The
13.. See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of
Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991
Wis. L. REV. 1275, 1289 (contending that Chevron is justified by the principle of judicial self-
restraint); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmak-
ing: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 486 (1990) (explaining that
Chevron is'justified by the agency's superior political accountability); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role
of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1254
(1989) [hereinafter Pierce, The Role of the Judiciary] (claiming that Chevron is justified as a means of
strengthening congressional oversight of agency decisionmaking); Scalia, supra note 10, at 516 (assert-
ing that Chevron is justified by implicit congressional intent about who should fill statutory gaps).
14. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 8, at 514-16, 525-26 (arguing that Chevron undermines the
separation of powers in favor of the executive branch); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an
Era of PresidenialLawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. R v. 123, 182-84 (1994) (arguing that a very deferential
application of Chevron, such as that used by the Court in Rust, results in the President having
unchecked lawmaking power); Scalia, supra note 10, at 514-16 (disagreeing with a separation of
powers justification for Chevron); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., OfLegislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, andArticle Ii, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 983-86 (1988) (discussing, with passing reference
to Chevron, judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and
the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22-31 (1983) (reviewing pre-Chevron judicial
deference to agency interpretations).
15. For descriptions of these theories-often accompanied by critiques and analyses of their
implications-seegenerally Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political
Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 579-95 (discussing the influence of various political theories on
administrative law theory); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1276, 1277 (1984) (asserting that the administrative bureaucracy is nondemocratic); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1516-41 (1992) (touting civic republicanism as a theoretical justification for agency decisionmaking);
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,1802-
05 (1975) (concluding that the "emerging interest representation" model fails to justify agency power);
Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 626 (1992)
(chastising the neoclassical model's formality and "all-or-nothing" approach with regard to judicial
oversight and recommending a return to the traditional model of administrative law).
16. Pluralistic democracy, or the interest group model of politics, traces its lineage to the political
theories of Robert Dahl and David Truman. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23-24 (1967); DAVID B. TRuMAN, THE
GOVE -NMENTALPROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTSAND PUBLIC OPINION 512-16 (1951) (both remarking
on the influence of unorganized interest groups on the more powerful, organized interest groups). The
pluralistic theory I refer to in this Article is a variant that sees interest group politics as a competition
for government-provided benefits to satisfy private desires. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
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Article then relies on critiques of the pluralistic perspective to argue that
the Chevron doctrine, as presently applied, fails to accord with public
policy. Finally, the Article applies a different political model of agency
decisionmaking, a model that views agencies as a means of fostering public
deliberation about government policy choices, and suggests a pragmatic
modification of the Chevron two-step. The proposed modification down-
plays the first beat of the Chevron two-step and emphasizes the second beat
by requiring reviewing courts to scrutinize more carefully the reasonable-
ness of agencies' statutory interpretation. In other words, this Article
advocates a "syncopated Chevron."
I. The Significance of Chevron
A. Review of Agencies' Statutory Interpretations Before Chevron
Chevron dramatically altered how courts review agency interpretations
of statutes. Prior to Chevron, reviewing courts maintained that the primary
and ultimate authority for interpreting statutes resided in the judiciary.17
Barring explicit congressional assignment of interpretive responsibility to
an administrative agency, the role of the agency implementing a regulatory
scheme was not to decide definitively "pure questions of law."" This is
not to say that courts never deferred to agency interpretations; in many
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36-38 (1957) (positing that voting patterns reflect the voter's expectation of
utility); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCrION 12-17 (1991) (addressing the dichotomy of and dynamics between pluralism and
republicanism as they relate to political self-interest); GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY:
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw 19-20 (1991) (stating that modem interest group theory views social
welfare as "simply the product of political competition, compromise, and agreement among various
segments of the public"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciay in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975) (asserting that legislation is driven
by private interest groups who outbid competing interest groups).
17. See Callahan, supra note 13, at 1281 (stating that prior to Chevron, courts deferred to an
agency's interpretation of a statute only if they decided that the particular case warranted deference);
Russell L. Weaver, Chevron: Martin, Anthony, andFormat Requirements, 40 KAN. L. REv. 587,587-
88 (1992) (concluding that prior to Chevron, courts usually reached an independent interpretive
decision); o f PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 253-56 (1989) (noting that before Chevron, courts used three different rationales to justify
deference to agency interpretations which placed the primary and ultimate responsibility for statutory
interpretation on the court, but that Chevron espoused a fourth rationale based on the assignment of this
responsibility to the agency); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 549, 569 (1985) (noting that modern administrative law has deviated from the under-
standing that courts must independently review all questions of law).
18. Scalia, supra note 10, at 516; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 2093-94. But cf. Edley, supra note
15, at 574-75 (noting that the judicial role of law-declaring often overlaps with the role of law-making,
a function that is presumptively the role of the implementing agency).
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cases they did.19 But, as explained in Skdmore v. Swift & Co.,'° judges
accorded such deference because
[i]nterpretations ... [of the agency], while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experi-
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may prop-
erly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case [depends] upon the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all of those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.21
Reviewing courts, however, stressed that the decision regarding deference,
and the ultimate responsibility for interpreting the statute, remained
theirs.' In many instances, courts chose to decipher statutes without any
attention to, let alone deference to, prior agency interpretations.'
This approach to reviewing agency statutory interpretation reflected a
tension between two theoretical justifications for the burgeoning administra-
tive state that dominated legal thinking until the late 1960s. The first
theoretical model, the formalist or transmission-belt' model, posits that
administrative agencies expediently implement the will of the legislature.'
19. E.g., Federal Election Comm'nv. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 42-
43 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 432 (1977); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 23 (1965);
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940).
20. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
21. Id. at 140. Technically, Skidmore addressed the deference that should begiven to an agency's
application of a statute when the court, rather than the agency, was authorized to adjudicate tie claim
in the first instance. See id. at 137-38 (explaining that with regard to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
although Congress placed the responsibility of factfinding on the courts, the courts nevertheless should
place due emphasis on the findings of the Administrator). But the courts have applied the Skidmore
standard in reviewing agency interpretations of statutes because, as in Skidmore, judges believed they
retained the ultimate decisionmaking authority. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 120 (1980) (citing Skidmore for its decision not to follow CPSC's inter-
pretation); Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (stating that an agency's statutory
interpretation is entitled to deference so long as it is "reasoned and supportable"); SEC v. Sloan, 436
U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978) (refusing to follow SEC's interpretation because it was inconsistent with the
commission's statutory mandate).
22. See Anthony, supra note 12, at 3 & n.4 (reasoning that under Skdmnore a "court should give
respectful consideration to the agency's construction, but may reject it, even if it seems a reasonable
one"); cf. Monaghan, supra note 14, at 27-28 (contending that giving deference to agency interpreta-
tions of statutes is not inconsistent with the principle that courts retain the ultimate authority to state
what the law is).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571,591 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (accusing
the Court of ignoring the IRS Commissioner's reasonable and consistent interpretation of the Internal
Revenue Code); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236-37 (1974) (declining to defer to a Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) rule because it was inconsistent with other BIA practices).
24. Richard Stewart coined the term "transmission-belt" model. Stewart, supra note 15, at 1675.
25. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., The Expansion ofAmerican Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REV.
430, 431 (1917) (-[A]dministrative law is the law applicableto the transmission of the will of the state,
from its source to the point of its application.").
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To overcome constitutional problems that arise from the possibility that
nonelected agency heads will make political choices, this model presumes
that Congress makes the hard political choices when it enacts legislation.'
It further presumes that specialized agencies more efficiently implement
those choices than can the President enforcing statutory provisions via full-
fledged judicial proceedings.27 Agencies with power to translate legisla-
tive policy into rules that govern particular situations, to find facts in
particular cases, and to apply the rules to the facts with some cognizance
of the exigencies of the precise situation provide an apparatus for imple-
menting the legislative will flexibly and effectively. But this model de-
mands that the outcome of a controversy before an agency follow directly
from the statutory policy; the agency's job is to find the facts and apply the
law to the particular situation, reaching a result determined by the circum-
stances and Congress's expressed policy.'
The formalist model of administrative agencies leaves little leeway for
agency discretion when interpreting statutes.29 It assumes that the agency
should not create policy, but rather implement the policy choices made by
the legislature.' Those legislative choices are communicated by statutes,
which therefore play an indispensable role in limiting agency action."
The judiciary ensures that the agency does not overstep its statutory
boundaries and implement policies different from those the legislature
expressed in the statute." Thus, fundamental to the transmission-belt
model is an understanding that courts are to interpret statutes de novo, both
to undergird the constitutionally infirm position of agencies and to guard
against agencies engaging in political decisionmaking. This model does not
countenance any deference to agency interpretations.
By the time of the New Deal, a second theoretical justification for
administrative agencies had arisen. This model, the expertise model,
26. Stewart, supra note 15, at 1675.
27. See Berle, supra note 25, at 439 ("But there arise problems which require particular and expert
handling .... Accordingly we conduct a special administrative body.., and charge this body with
the duty of investigating the problem and of laying down the rule which will reach the given result."
(emphasis in original)).
28. For a more detailed description of the formalist model, see Frug, supra note 15, at 1297-99;
Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1516-18; Stewart, supra note 15, at 1672-76.
29. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1673 (stating that under the formalist model, "[t]he requirement
that agencies comform to specific legislative directives not only legitimates administrative action by
reference to a higher authority, but also curbs officials' exploitation of the governmental apparatus to
give vent to private prejudice or passion").
30. See, e.g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 394 (1894) ("[The Texas
Railroad Commission] is merely an administrative body created by the state for carrying into effect the
will of the state, as expressed by its legislation.").
31. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1673 (describing the formalist view that agencies must conform
to legislative directives in order to control misuses of the system by agency officials).
32. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HAkv. L. REV. 505, 577 (1985);
Stewart, supra note 15, at 1674-76.
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emphasizes the experience and technical knowledge of agencies and their
staffs.33 In the ever-increasing complexity of the era, many theorists
argued that Congress could not fully understand, let alone resolve, all the
policy issues the federal government must address.' Congress's role was
to identify problems needing regulatory solutions and to establish agencies
to address those problems.35 Agencies would solve these problems using
the professional knowledge of their staffs and their experience in dealing
repeatedly with similar issues arising within a specialized regulatory
area.
36
The expertise model of agencies attempts to avoid the constitutional
infirmity of nonelected agencies making policy by characterizing agency
decisions as technical and therefore value-neutral. This model admits
that agencies have broad discretion to make regulatory policy; agency
decisions are not usually dictated by simply applying statutory mandates to
the circumstances of a particular situation.3 ' Nonetheless, the model
33. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENTCOMMISSION 51 (1955)
(recounting the views of Joseph Eastman who considered agencies the proper source of broad power
due to their expertiseand experience); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVEPROCESS 23-24 (1938)
(emphasizing the need for expertise in the administrative state); Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal
Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REV. 299, 306-07 (1983)
(describing the New-Deal-era view that advised deference to agencies' expertise).
34. See LANDIS, supra note 33, at 24 (contending that efficiency in regulation is best served by
the creation of more agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 421, 440 (1987) (noting that the perception of the inadequacy of the institutional framework
led to grants of authority to regulatory agencies); cf. Gifford, supra note 33, at 306 (noting that
informational scarcity and lack of expertise outside of regulatory agencies provided "major justifica-
tion[s] for conferring broad discretionary power on regulatory agencies'). In addition, architects of
the New Deal espoused a healthy distrust of the political processes that characterized legislative
decisionmaking as a means of solving regulatory problems. The New Deal model thus called for
agencies to be relatively independent of immediate political influence. See JAMES 0. FREEDMAN,
CRISIS AND LEmMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 59-60 (1978)
(reviewing Progressive- and New-Deal-era rationales for granting agencies independence from the
political process); LANDIS, supra note 33, at 113-14 (contrasting examples of good and bad results from
politically independent agencies).
35. The New Deal model envisions the possibility of an enabling act that provides bounds on the
scope of agency discretion. See LANDIS, supra note 33, at 52-60 (citing areas in which statutory
limitations would be appropriate). For many areas of regulation, however, the New Deal model coun-
sels that the enabling act merely authorizes the agency to regulate an industry or area of the economy
under a broad "public interest" standard. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? 38
(1988) (noting that New Deal advocates argued that agencies must be free to serve the greatest good
of the greatest number).
36. LANDIS, supra note 33, at 23-24.
37. See MJ.C. vILE, CONsffITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF PoWERS 277-80 (1967)
(referring to the'view that agencies are madhlnelike -nterpreters and appliers of statutes); Philip J.
Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557,
559 (1987) (noting that the eipertise model required the insulation of experts from "political contamina-
tion").
38. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1519, 1518-19 (observing that the expertise model relied on
the "professional spirit" of the regulators to deter them from setting unwise policy).
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posits that agency decisions are not political because if everyone had the
same knowledge and experience as the agency, all would agree that the
agency's solution was best for the public interest.39 In other words,
although agencies may set regulatory policy, they do not make contro-
versial, value-laden choices, but rather use their expertise to solve technical
problems left to them by Congress.'
Thus, the expertise model of administrative agencies frequently called
upon courts to defer to agency decisions. With respect to statutory
interpretation, this model would have had courts defer to agency imple-
mentation of vaguely worded statutes instructing the agency to further the
public interest.4" But the expertise model preserved a role for the courts
to ensure that agencies did not overstep their jurisdictions or address issues
beyond those Congress intended them to address.4 Hence, the expertise
model did not envision judicial deference to agencies' interpretations of
statutes when the issue involved the parsing of statutory language or
legislative history rather than the implementation of broadly worded lan-
guage in a technical regulatory regime. This judicial role was reflected in
the courts' maintenance of the ultimate responsibility to interpret statutes
and their propensity to defer based on the persuasiveness of the agency's
position in light of its greater expertise.43
Following World War II, the legal process school' suggested a juris-
prudence that alleviated the tension between the formalist and realist
theories underlying pre-war models of the administrative state.45  The
legal process theory looked to the comparative abilities of the various
39. Id. at 1519 (justifying discretionary decisions undertheexpertise model as executingthe "will
of the people").
40. See id.; Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-TheIntersection ofLaw & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 821, 823 (1990) (both asserting that the expertise model sees agency decisions as technical
assessments based on superior information and expertise).
41. ALFRED C. AmAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 15 (1992) (observing that
the use of broad delegation clauses fostered regulatory experimentation).
42. Id. at 17 (noting that despite deferential judicial review of agency power after the New Deal,
courts would not affirm agency decisions if no legal basis existed for the action).
43. As Judge Wald noted, "The common wisdom [of courts before Chevron was] that on matters
of statutory interpretation, courts generally had the last word." Transcript, The Contribution of the
D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 507, 529 (1988) [hereinafter Contribution of
D.C. Circuit] (comments of Patricia M. Wald at the Section of Administrative Law Fall Meeting in
October, 1987).
44. See Werhan, supra note 15, at 576 ("This 'Theoretical Watershed' has come to be known as
the legal process school of jurisprudence, named for the leading text by Harvard law professors Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks .... ." (citation omitted)). See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAAL PROCESS: BAsIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative
ed. 1958).
45. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in
the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. RE. 691, 695 (1987) (listing the assumptions underlying
legal process jurisprudence); Werhan, supra note 15, at 576-77 (explaining the appeal of the legal
process theory's promise of enlightened, but measured, functionalism).
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institutions of government in order to allocate decisionmaking authority.'
In addition, the theory stressed that "duly established procedures" were
crucial to the legitimacy of government decisionsY In the administrative
law arena, the legal process approach provided the underpinnings for the
federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)" and defined the "tradi-
tional" model of agency decisionmaking, which dominated this arena until
the 1970s."9
The traditional model of administrative law is an amalgam of the for-
malistic and expertise models.' On the one hand, the traditional model
characterized policysetting via rulemaking as legislative in nature and
joined the expertise model's call for minimal legislative-type procedures
and deferential judicial review.51 On the other hand, the traditional model
characterizes factfinding within agency adjudication as judicial in nature
and generally envisions the transmission-belt model's formal judicial-type
procedures and close judicial supervision of adjudicatory decision-
making.52
Under the traditional model, an electorally accountable Congress is the
appropriate body to formulate the basic public purposes undergirding the
46. See Gary Pellet, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. LL. REF. 561, 595, 594-98
(1988) (arguing that legislatures should deal with substantive issues involving values, preferences, and
ends; courts should engage in "reasoned elaboration" of legislative policies; and administrative agencies
should implement legislative mandates according to their expertise); Werhan, supra note 15, at 577
(noting that legal process thinking counsels decisionmakers to play to their strengths and to avoid their
areas of weakness).
47. According to the leading exponents of the legal process school, "decisions which are the duly
arrived at result of duly established procedures. . . 'ought' to be accepted as binding upon the whole
society." HART & SACKS, supra note 44, at 4-5.
48. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1988) (original version at ch. 324, 60
Stat. 237 (1946)).
49. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as
a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 710 (1991) (observing that the tension-besetlegal
process tradition survived essentially unchanged until the 1970s); Werhan, supra note 15, at 577, 582
(citing the APA as the most authoritative embrace of the traditional model of administrative law and
maintaining that the legal process theory's assumptions supported the core components of the traditional
model); see also Thomas 0. Sargentich, Teaching Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 1
WIDENER i. PUB. L. 147, 155-56 (1992) (noting that the APA became a vehicle for compromise, be-
tween the formalist and legal realist visions of the administrative state, that hinged on process-oriented
limitations on administrators).
50. See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 49, at 710 (discussing the internal tension in the legal
process theory's methods and goals); Werhan, supra note 15, at 579 (noting that legal process theorists
did not believe that the expertise model alone could support the legitimacy of agency authority).
51. See Werhan, supra note 15, at 579 (observing that the traditional theory counsels courts to
avoid policymaking functions). -
52. These characterizations molded the structure of the federal APA, which attempts to graft quasi-
judicial procedures onto agencies with broad policysetting functions. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,1265-66 (1986) (explainingthat the APA
places little constraint on rulemaking power but provides an elaborate adjudicative structure).
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statutes it adopts. 3 In administering a statute, the agency, acting pursuant
to statutory authority and using appropriate procedures, is to devise policies
rationally aimed to achieve the statutory purpose.' Although this left
room for agency discretion, agency policy choices are to be driven by
application of their expertise to the task of best furthering the public
purposes of the statute.5 Born as a mixture of two models that envi-
sioned no role for politics in agency decisionmaking, the traditional model
does not see agency policysetting as a predominantly political endeavor.56
With respect to statutory interpretation, the traditional model supports
Skidmore deference. On issues of law, the legal process school posits that
courts must retain ultimate authority to ensure that the agency acts
consistently with the purposes of the authorizing statute.57  But for
questions of law whose answers might be informed by technical expertise
or day-to-day experience administering the statute, the legal process
approach views agencies as the proper forum for resolution.5" Hence, the
legal process school fell victim to the tension inherent in Skidmore, which
counseled deference to agency interpretations when appropriate even as it
reinforced the notion that courts remain the final arbiters of the statutory
meaning.
Perhaps for this reason, the APA doctrine governing statutory inter-
pretation prior to Chevron is best described as schizophrenic. 59  Judges
53. See HART & SACKS, supra note 44, at 721 (arguing that only the generally accountable legisla-
ture "has the toughness and resiliency to hammer out solutions [to major policy dilemmas] which will
command acceptance"); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 45, at 697 (describing Hart & Sacks's legisla-
tive legitimacy as implicitly based on interested participation in the legislative process); Peller, supra
note 46, at 600 (noting that for legal process theorists, "the legislature's democratic character.., made
it appropriate as the final arbiter of substantive decision making"); Werhan, supra note 15, at 577
(contending that, in a representative system, Congress is well positioned to formulate public policy).
54. Werhan, supra note 15, at 580.
55. See Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative
Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. R-v. 646, 656 (1988) ("Traditional administrative theory assumed that the
application of neutral expertise in administrative regulation would achieve socially desirable ends better
than would an imperfect market.").
56. See Werhan, supra note 15, at 569-70 ("The traditional model takes seriously the conception
of administrative agency as 'agent,' whose 'authority' is limited to acts done in accordance with the
'consent' of Congress, as manifested in the enabling act.").
57. Id. at 580.
58. See id. at 576-77 ("In some circumstances, legal process theorists argued, one such reasonable
legislative decision would be to delegate authority to administrative agencies.... This rather casual,
functional approval of delegation retained... faith in the expertise of administrators to achieve the
public-policy agenda set by Congress.").
59. Examples of cases in which the courts paid little heed to agency interpretation of authorizing
statutes include: Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) ("[Slince the only or principle dispute
relates to the meaning of the statutory term, the controversy must ultimately be resolved [not by the
agency], but by judicial application of canons of statutory construction."); NLRB v. Highland Park
Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1951) (rejecting the claim that the NLRB decision is not subject to
judicial review); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1947) (characterizing the
issue of whether foremen are "employees" under the NLRA as a "naked question of law" and refusing
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who believed agencies to be merely expedient means of implementing con-
gressional intent tended to ignore agency statutory interpretations, while
those who subscribed to the expertise model were apt to apply Skidmore
deference, asserting that agencies' experience and technical knowledge of
their regulatory areas lent persuasiveness to agency interpretations.'
B. The Chevron Doctrine and Its Political-Theory Underpinnings
In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that when a court reviews an
agency's interpretation of a statute, it must engage in a limited two-step
process: First, the court must ask whether "Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue .... [T]he court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.""
Second, if the court determines that "the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."62
The court must affirm any "reasonable interpretation made by the ...
agency. "'
I Since the Court decided Chevron, lower courts have applied its
dictates with unusual consistency and often with an almost alarming
rigor.'a To the extent that Chevron has generated dissension among lower
courts, the dispute primarily concerns the vigor with which judges inquire,
to adhere to the NLRB's prior decisions). Examples of cases in which courts deferred to agency inter-
pretations include: Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (acknowledging the need to defer to
agencies' interpretations of statutes); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)
(noting the limited rule of the judiciary once the agency has administered the statute and deferring to
the NLRB regarding whether newsboys are "employees" under the NLRA).
60. Commentatorshave often remarked that prior to Chevron, the level of deference courts paid
to agency interpretations of statutes was inconsistent. E.g., Anthony, supra note 12, at 6; Jerome
Nelson, The Chevron Deference Rule and Judicial Review of FERC Orders, 9 ENERGY L.J. 59, 60
(1988); see also, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERcE, JR., Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4,
at 348-49 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that prior to 1984, "the Supreme Court maintained two inconsistent
lines of cases that purported t6 instruct courts concerning the proper judicial role in reviewing agency
interpretations of agency-administered statutes").
61. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
62. Id. at 843.
63. Id. at 844.
64. See Anthony, supra note 12, at 3; see also Schuck & Elliot, supra note 5, at 1032 (finding
that Chevron significantly altered the percentage of cases in which lower courts reversed agencies on
issues of substantive law); cf Contribution ofD. C. Circuit, supra note 43, at 529-30 (stating that the
D.C. Circuit is moving to a, more balanced approach to reviewing agency interpretations of statutes
after an initial period of applying "a fairly rigid approach to [Chevron]"); Pierce, supra note 8, at 302
(observing that some courts have adopted a "weak" reading of Chevron). But of. Russell L. Weaver
& Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretation of Regulations: A Post-Chevron
Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. Rsv. 411,445-46 (1992) (noting that lower courts often do not defer
to an agency reading of a statute it administers when the agency has interpreted the statute
inconsistently in the past).
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at step one, whether a statute has resolved the question addressed by the
agency.' Some judges read Chevron as a strong signal from the Supreme
Court that courts should not interfere with agency interpretations unless all
would agree that the statute clearly evidences a contrary meaning on the
precise question before the agency.' These deferential courts generally
find statutes silent or ambiguous at step one of the Chevron analysis and
tend to affirm agency interpretations at step two.67 Other judges read the
Supreme Court's message in Chevron as a more limited suggestion that
courts may overturn an agency interpretation, but only if the court itself is
certain about congressional intent regarding the meaning of the statute."
These active courts tend to resolve more cases by finding statutes clear at
step one of the Chevron analysis and less frequently reach step two.'
65. See Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 367 (comments of Cass R. Sunstein) (asserting that the
weak reading of Chevron recognizes "a large area in which Congress has 'directly addressed precise
questions ... '" while under the strong reading, "generally there will be ambiguity" (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842)).
66. See, e.g., Massachusetts Dep't of Educ. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 837 F.2d 536, 541
(Ist Cir. 1988) ("Ordinarily... an agency's interpretation will carry the day, unless it is determined
to be clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the statutory plan."); see also Cohen& Spitzer, supra note
5, at 105 (showing that lower courts appear to have gotten the Supreme Court's message that they are
to leave agencies greater discretion in interpreting their authorizing statutes).
67. E.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 134
(1985); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 914 F.2d 276, 280-81 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991); Newport News Shipbuilding& Dry DockCo. v. Howard, 904 F.2d 206,
210-11 (4th Cir. 1990); National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 866 F.2d 717, 733 (5th Cir. 1989).
68. For example, see Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 747 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
dismissed, 473 U.S. 930 (1985). Judge Bork, writing for the Court of Appeals, was faced with inter-
preting the term "such new schedules" as used in the Federal Power Act. Id. at 768-69. The court
struck down the Federal Regulatory Energy Commission's (FERC) interpretation of this language with-
out mentioning Chevron. Judge Ginzburg in dissent retorted that the statute, as interpreted by the
FERC, "serves the general intent of Congress.... If the legislative history does not instruct
otherwise, FERC's current interpretation merits deferential judicial consideration." Id. at 774 (citing
Chevron).
69. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-50 (1987) (holding that the INS's
interpretation of the deportation clause of the Immigration and Nationality Act transgressed clear
congressional intent); Productions Workers Union v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(finding that NLRB's interpretation of the "secondary boycott" provision of the NLRA was inconsistent
with Congress's intent). The dissension regarding the vigor that courts should use in their step-one
inquiry is related to a controversy about the extent courts should use legislative history and background
norms-such as canons of statutory construction-in determining whether a statute is silent or
ambiguous under Chevron. See Edles, supra note 5, at 711 (noting that judges are split regarding
whether legislative intent should be considered in a Chevron analysis when the language of a statute
is unclear); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Scope of Judicial Review of Issues of Law: Chevron Revisited,
6 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 277, 286 (1992) (discussing the judicial division regarding what materials
should be considered in determining congressional intent). Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
184 (1991) (using a pure textual approach at step one) with American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S.
606, 609-14 (1991) (considering language, legislative history, structure, and policy of the National
Labor Relations Act at step one). Generally, courts that take an active role in determining the meaning
of a statute at step one are more willing to rely on all the traditional tools of statutory construction.
See Denise W. DeFranco, Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction, 58 GFO. WASH. L. REV.
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Regardless of whether a reviewing court is deferential or active, once it
reaches step two it rarely reverses an agency interpretation as unreason-
able.' As Judge Stephen Williams suggests, an agency interpretation
fails the reasonableness test "[o]nly when it would flunk the laugh test at
the Kennedy School of Public Policy."71 Less glib judges have explained
that an agency interpretation is unreasonable under Chevron's step two only
if it actually frustrates the policies that Congress was seeking to
effectuate. 2 So long as the interpretation furthers some statutory goal,
a reviewing court has no business reversing the agency determination, even
when the court believes that the agency interpretation reflects an unjustified
balance of competing interests. 3
The deferential courts' strong reading of Chevron essentially transfers
the primary responsibility for interpreting regulatory statutes from the
courts to the agency authorized to administer the statute.74 Except in
829, 831 (1990) (discussing the D.C. Circuit's active use of statutory construction under Chevron);
Merrill, supra note 5, at 991 (noting that as judges consider a statute's plain meaning, rather than its
text, they are more likely to consider legislative intent). But see Scalia, supra note 10, at 521 (arguing
that most statutes can be declared unambiguous from the text alone). This controversy is part of a
greater debate about the extent to which courts should use legislative history and nontextual sources to
divine congressional intent or, even more loosely, legislative purpose rather than taking a literal
approach to interpreting statutes. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621, 624 (1990) (discussing Justice Scalia's desire to eliminate all considerations of legislative
history in statutory interpretation); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241,256 (1992) (noting the Supreme Court's
differing views regarding textualism and interpretationism); Merrill, supra note 5, at 990-91 (discussing
the Supreme Court's recent revival of pure textual interpretations of statutes); Patricia M. Wald, The
Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277,281 & n.16 (1990) (describing the controversy
at the Supreme Court over the use of legislative history when construing statutes); see also infra notes
192-94 and accompanying text.
70. See Slawson, supra note 7, at 406 ("Under Chevron, the only way a reviewing court can
revise an agency decision resting on legislative history is to determine that the agency's interpretation
... was unreasonable. For obvious reasons, this can rarely be done." (footnote omitted)); see also
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1985) (refusing to override
an agency's interpretation of the Clean Water Act even though such interpretation may seem unreason-
able "loin a purely linguistic level").
71. Panel Discussion, supra note 9, at 124 (comments of Judge Stephen Williams).
72. E.g., Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1453 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Starr, J.); Silberman, supra note 40, at 827. Both judges Starr and Silberman clearly manifest
disapproval of courts involving themselves in the debate about policy, which often underlies the
agency's interpretive choice. See, e.g., Continental Air Lines, 843 F.2d at 1451 (Starr, J.) ("To do
so... portends a judicial supplanting of a key actor in the drama, namely the agency itself, present
on stage at Congress' express direction."); Silberman, supra note 40, at 827 ("[S]triking down an
agency interpretation . . . can all too often conceal judicial allegiance to one side of what was a
congressional compromise or dislike for the policy implications of the executive's actions.").
73. See Silberman, supra note 40, at 828 ("If the agency [considered and weighed the factors
Congress wished the agency to bring to bear on its decision], that the court would have struck the
balance somewhat differently cannot be grounds to overturn the agency's action.").
74. See Contribution of D.C. Circuit, supra note 43, at 529 (noting that after Chevron, courts
defer to agencies in a wide array of situations); see also supra note 17.
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those relatively rare instances in which Congress considered and provided
an answer to the precise point at issue, the agency is presumed to have the
authority to interpret the statute by formulating policy and filling "any gap
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress."75 Even under the weaker
reading by active courts, Chevron counsels that courts share a significant
responsibility for statutory interpretation with agencies. Moreover,
Chevron implicitly justifies this transfer of responsibility largely on the
theory that agencies are more politically accountable than courts.76 By
this shift of responsibility, however, Chevron deviates from both the
transmission-belt and expertise models' principle that an agency's role is
not to resolve controversial political disputes, especially not via statutory
interpretation. Instead, Chevron comports with a more recent model of
administrative authority that derives from the political theory of pluralistic
democracy.
The pluralistic theory views the democratic process as a competition
between various interest groups for government-provided benefits.77
Supporters of the pluralist theory argue that the political arena operates like
75. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
76. See, e.g., id. at 865, 865-66 ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices .... ). Chevron recognizes that in many instances, statutory interpretation
involves choosing between competing policies rather than divining true congressional intent. See
Pierce, supra note 8, at 305-07 (noting that judicial interpretation often involves the resolution of a
policy dispute); Silberman, supra note 40, at 823 (arguing that judicial interpretation "implicates and
sometimes squarely involves policy making"). It implicitly relies on the belief that American notions
of democracy require that such a choice be made by politically accountable institutions rather than the
politically insulated judiciary. See Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a
Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 371-72 (1984) (noting that the political
branches of government are more flexible, have access to a greater scope of informational resources,
and are more attuned to the desires of the voting public than the judicial branch); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 504-
13 (1985) (arguing that political decisions should be made by politically accountable branches of the
government); cf Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions ofLaw and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363,389-90 (1986) (detailing the difficulty courts have in reviewing complex, politically driven agency
decisions). Chevron's conclusion that courts should play a less active role in interpreting statutes is
thus consistent with a trend toward an increasing reliance on political accountability rather than apoliti-
cal agency expertise to justify agency discretion. See Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role
of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 181, 183 (1986) (noting the
dichotomy between those who see administrative agencies' role as the application of expertise and those
who view their role as political).
77. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 20-24 (noting that many economists view legisla-
tion as the product of special interest group politics); EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS
35-36 (1952) (arguing that a government'sjob is to referee the struggle for benefits between various
groups); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MOMT. SCi. 3,
4-6 (1971) (arguing that industry is consistently seeking to use the coercive powers of the state to
control entry into markets); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 32 (1985) (discussing the pluralist belief that politics is a process of conflict among groups
with differing social interests).
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a market in which votes are the currency that interest groups spend to
procure the government benefits they seek.78 Deal-making mechanisms
such as vote-trading and log-rolling allow the legislature to reach the
equivalent of economic equilibrium in which government allocates benefits
to interest groups in proportion to the number of voters who share a
group's values and the intensity with which the voters hold these values.79
Advocates of pluralistic democracy thus herald it as the preferred means
of maximizing the political satisfaction of an electorate posited to have
needs and desires that are exogenous to the political process.'
Unfortunately for advocates of pluralistic democracy, Congress is not
very efficient at generating the interest group deals that drive the pluralist
model."1 The magnitude of the entire federal regulatory agenda, coupled
with the size of Congress and the need to get a majority of two houses and
the signature of the President, prevents otherwise politically justified deals
from becoming law.' In addition, the committee system reinforces con-
gressional inertia that bogs down most legislation.'a Committees serve a
gate-keeping function that can kill legislation that might otherwise become
law were the committee to allow the bill to reach the floor." When all
78. E.g., FARBER& FRIcKEY, supra note 16, at 22-23; Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211,214 (1976); Stigler, supra note 77, at 10-13.
79. See Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation andInstitutional Design in State and Local Government
Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 635-36 (1994) (defining "log-rolling" and explaining how it allows legisla-
tures to take into account the intensity of its members' interest in legislation).
80. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1521 & n.47; Sunstein,' supra note 77, at 32-33 (both
describing the pluralist model as the best means of satisfying the diverse preferences of the citizenry).
81. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1521 (suggesting that the diversity of issues constituents want
addressed and the rate at which those issues change dictate that the inefficient legislative process is not
able to keep up); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 33 ("[Iinterest group theories cannot explain institutional structures such
as the system of checks and balances, which actually hinder Congress's provision of interest group
demands.").
82. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power, 36 AM. U.L. REV.
391, 405-06 (1987) (noting that congressional bureaucracy often leads to irresponsible legislative
action); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 331 (1987) (noting
that the demands on Congress's agenda exceed its capacity to make decisions).
83. See STEVENS. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER 3. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 226 (2d ed.
1990) (indicating that the committee system can complicate the task of party leaders seeking quick
legislative action); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential
Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1188 (1994) (remarking that
legislative change is difficult because committees act as "gatekeepers" that prevent proposals from
reaching the floor).
84. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PuBLIc POLICY 373 (1988); Kenneth A. Schepsle &
Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85,
86 (1987) (both noting that committees can use their gate-keeping function during earlier legislative
stages to affect the voting power of other members on the floor); cf. KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T.
TERNmy, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCpACY 314-15, 395-96, 398 (1986) (noting
that organized interest groups are especially effective at blocking government action); STRAUSS, supra
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is said aid done, the number of constituencies that must agree to the
passage of any proposed bill ensures that few, other than the most avidly
and universally supported, ever find their way into the United States
Code.' Congress simply cannot generate enough legislation to satisfy the
demands of interest groups."
A pluralistic theory of the administrative state favors policy-setting by
agencies in order to provide greater regulatory benefits.' Under this
theory, Congress is free to delegate the task of formulating and adopting
regulatory schemes to agencies, which are relatively free from the cum-
bersome constraints of separation of powers and an archaic committee
system.8" So long as Congress maintains sufficient influence over an
agency to ensure that regulations remain true to the interests of the enacting
coalition-either by the terms of the initial authorizing legislation, by direct
oversight of agency decisions via statutory amendment or through budget
constraints, or by a system of administrative procedures and "fire
alarms"' -- it pays for the legislature to set in motion the administrative
regulatory apparatus.' According to the pluralistic democracy model,
note 17, at 54 ("Even seemingly popular proposals for legislation are often defeated [in committee] by
powerful members.").
85. See Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on Government,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 280, 288-90 (1990) (suggesting that legislation may be prevented by influential
groups acting to kill unfavorable legislation); David Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Programs Under
the FederalResource Conservation and RecoveryAct, 12 ENVrL. L. 679,708 (1982) (complainingthat
it is difficult to get environmental legislation passed because of the competing interest groups).
86. See Pierce, supra note 82, at 404 (noting that Congress is too inefficient to make thousands
of decisions annually); Stewart, supra note 82, at 331 (arguing that Congress's 16th-century legislative
procedure is incapable of making enough decisions to satisfy 20th-century interest groups); Peter Woll,
Introduction to PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY: SELECTED ESSAYS 1, 8-9, 11-12 (Peter Woll
ed., 1966) (contending that it is "impossible" for the President and Congress to tend to all legislative
concerns given informational and temporal constraints); cf. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56-58 (1982) (arguing that legislators delegate the law-
making function to agencies in order to maximize public-sector production of private goods).
87. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1523 (asserting that agency policysetting is justified under
pluralistic theory because it is effective at meeting the demands of interest groups).
88. See SMITH & DEItNG, supra note 83, at 226 (contending that a more elastic system is needed
in order to efficiently deal with the rapidly changing issues of the day).
89. Procedural controls may work by giving interest groups within the enacting coalition an
informational advantage. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments
of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243,256-60 (1987) (noting that procedural constraints allow
interest groups more opportunities to respond to agency decisions). Alternatively, procedural controls
can stack the deck in favor of administrative decisions that benefit these interest groups. Id. at 261-63.
Fire-alarm systems operate by threatening congressional intervention to benefit the groups in the
coalition if events signal that the agency will not favor such groups. Id. at 274. Both procedural
controls and fire alarms can overcome pluralist concerns about legislative inefficiency because they
induce agency decisionmaking that satisfies the interests of the coalition that put together the legislative
deal without direct congressional intervention.
90. See Rodriguez, supra note 83, at 1187 (asserting that Congress delegates authority to agencies
because it fears tying itself to a precise piece of legislation and it prefers to allow flexibility through
agencies). For a discussion of various positive political theory explanations for why legislators might
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agencies should make political choices that satisfy the demands of the
interest groups that make up the constituency of the directly accountable
branches of government-Congress and the President.91
This is the precise role that the Chevron Court sees agencies playing.
Chevron involved a change in the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) interpretation of the term "stationary source" that was seemingly
prompted by the replacement of the environmentally sensitive administra-
tion of President Jimmy Carter with the business-oriented administration
of President Ronald Reagan. 92 The Court explicitly recognized an incum-
bent administration's policies as a legitimate factor that might influence an
agency to alter its interpretation of such a statutory term.'
In applying Chevron, most lower courts have remained true to its
pluralistic vision. Judges presume that Congress authorized agencies to
resolve the controversial political issues that arise out of statutory
interpretation." Only if the reviewing court is convinced that Congress
gave a clear answer contrary to that given by the agency may the court
reverse the agency's interpretation at step one of Chevron.' At step two,
courts almost never overturn agency interpretations as unreasonable.' In
essence, a court will overturn an agency interpretation only if the court
believes that the agency violated a political deal struck by Congress. When
a court determines that Congress has struck no particular bargain, it leaves
the political deal-making to the agency and trusts the political process to
constrain the agency from interpretations at odds with popular sentiments
and values.' Hence, Chevron presumes that once a reviewing court
find it in their self-interest to delegate regulatory discretion to administrative agencies, see Rodriguez,
supra note 81, at 74-77.
91. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: WhyAdmnlsfrators ShouldMake PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-96 (1985); Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1522-24.
92. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857-58
(1984) (observing that, when the new administration took office in 1981, EPA re-evaluated the defini-
tion of "source").
93. Id. at 865.
94. See, e.g., Aikansas State Bank Comm'r v. RTC, 911 F.2d 161, 173 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting
that Congress may have desired RTC to strike a balance between competing interests as situations
warranted); Hazardous Waste Treatnient Councilv. EPA, 861 F.2d 270, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating
that Congress wanted EPA to choose between conflicting goals), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
95. General Motors Corp. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 170 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 274; see also Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush,
946 F.2d 918, 924-25 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that "language need not be pellucid without the aid
of a special lens," but a canon of interpretation is not sufficient to "supply a precise meaning to an
otherwise ambiguous text"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961) (contending that as long as
a policy choice is reasonable in that it is not prohibited by Congress, a court will not overturn it, even
though the court may feel another coursewould be better); see also supra notes 70-72 and accompany-
ing text; cf. Garre, supra note 6, at 953 ("[Sltep one ... has become the 'primary battleground' on
which challenges to agency statutory interpretations are fought.").
97. Some versions of pluralistic democracy reserve a greater role for courts to correct imperfec-
tions in the political process. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1712 (asserting that judicial review should
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deems a statute ambiguous, resolution of its meaning is a political endeavor
best left to the agency, subject only to superficial judicial review."
The recent controversial Supreme Court decision in Rust v. Sullivan"
illustrates how Chevron embodies this pluralistic understanding of the role
of agencies. Rust involved regulations adopted by the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that interpreted and
implemented Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act.1"° Section
1008 provides that "[n]one of the funds appropriated [for family planning
projects] shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning.""'1 This provision was part of the original Title X of the Act,
enacted in 1970." For seventeen years following Title X's enactment,
HHS had permitted Title X projects to provide information about abortion
and to refer pregnant clients who wished to have an abortion to facilities
where the procedure could be performed."tu
In July of 1987, President Reagan personally announced that HHS
would soon propose new regulations clarifying the statutory prohibition on
the use of Title X funds in programs that engage in abortion-related
activities."c This announcement culminated a six-year debate about
whether HHS could legally adopt such restrictions on abortion refer-
rals.105 Although Reagan had consistently taken an anti-abortion stand,
focus on assuring fair representation for all affected interests); see also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DismuSr 76-77 (1980) (arguing that thejudiciary's role in constitutional law is to ensure an open
political process and correct for biases in the political market). Those versions more consistent with
Chevron's hands-off approach to review, however, see agency procedures as part of the deal struck by
Congress with interest groups. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) ("[T]his Court has for more than four decades
emphasized that the formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the discretion of agencies
to which Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judgments."); McCubbins et al.,
supra note 89, at 274 (arguing that interest groups achieve political representation through Congress's
drafting of administrative procedures).
98. In addition to allowing an agency to appease special interest groups, Chevron deference also
affords an agency greater leeway to interpret statutes according to the agency's idiosyncratic notion of
the public interest. But this still may be preferable to leaving interpretations to reflect judges' idio-
syncratic views of the public interest because the political branches provide a greater check on runaway
agencies than on runaway courts. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1550-51 (contending that courts
are insulated from the "political pulse of the people" while agencies are subject to the review of
Congress and the President).
99. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300aaa (1988).
101. id. § 300a-6.
102. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 1008,
84 Stat. 1504, 1508 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988)).
103. HHS Regulations Regarding Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs
Where Abortion Is a Method of Family Planning, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2923 (1988) [hereinafter
Abortion Counseling Regulations].
104. Id. at 2922.
105. Spencer Rich, Reagan to 71ghten Family-Planning Aid Rules, WASH. POST, July 30, 1987,
at A9.
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the unusual step of a presidential announcement of the proposed regulations
and the timing of the announcement-occurring six-and-a-half years into
the Reagan presidency, just as the religious right had begun to express
concern about the Administration's would-be presidential candidate, then
Vice President Bush 10-suggests that the regulations were aimed at
appeasing the religious right. As such, they appeared motivated in great
part by interest group politics.
The final regulations adopted by HHS, commonly dubbed the "gag
rule," 7 prohibited federally funded family-planning projects from
encouraging, promoting, or advocating abortion as a method of family
planning."° More particularly, the regulations barred Title X projects
from counseling pregnant clients about abortion or referring them for
abortion as a method of family planning."° Instead, Title X projects had
to refer every pregnant client "for appropriate prenatal and/or social
services by furnishing a list of available providers that promote the welfare
of mother and unborn child." 1 ° This list could neither be weighted in
favor of health-care providers that perform abortions, nor could it include
health-care centers that provided abortions as their principal business."'
The lists also had to include available providers who did not offer abortions
and could not "steer" clients to providers who perform abortions as a
method of family planning.1
Although Rust is best known for its constitutional assessment of the
regulations,1 for purposes of this Article its more significant discussion
106. See Thomas B. Edsall, Will Feuds Sink the GOP?, WASH. POST, June 3, 1987, at A19
(discussing the conflict between the Bush forces and the religious right's intent on gaining power in the
GOP). One direct manifestation of this concern was the candidacy of the popular conservative
evangelist, Pat Robertson. See Samuel G. Freedman, Back in the Spotlight, Falwell Retains Long-Held
Goals for God and Country, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1987, at AI8 (referencing political scientists who
contend that Robertson's presidential candidacy was proof of the changes the Moral Majority hoped
to create). Political pundits began to take seriously the Reverend Robertson's intention to compete with
George Bush for the Republicanpresidential nominationjust prior to President Reagan's announcement
of the forthcoming proposed regulations. See Wayne King, Robertson Bid Relying on Caucuses and
Fervor, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1987, at A12 (noting that recent polls and outcomes in the Michigan
caucuses indicated to analysts that the "Christian vote" could "have an impact in caucus situations").
107. See Eric Pianin, White House Circulates Memo in Move to Retain Ban on Abortion Counsel-
ing, WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 1991, at A7 (announcing that the House is to vote on a bill with language
prohibiting expenditure of funds to enforce "what critics call the 'gag rule'").
108. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (1993),suspendedby Presidential Memorandum,TheTitle X "GagRule,"
58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993).
109. Id. § 59.8(a)(1).
110. Id. § 59.8 (a) (2).
111. Id. § 59.8(a)(3).
112. Id. § 59.8(a)(3).
113. See generally Scott E. Johnson, Comment, Rust v. Sullivan: The Supreme Court Upholds the
71tle XAboron-Counseling Gag Rule, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 220-30 (1991) (recounting and ana-
lyzing the Supreme Court's treatment of the First Amendment challenge to the new Title X regulations).
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addresses a challenge to HHS's interpretation of Section 1008, on which
the Department explicitly relied to justify its regulations." 4 Despite the
blatantly political impetus for the agency's new regulations, the Court
applied the deferential Chevron doctrine to affirm the agency's revised
interpretation of Section 1008.5
Applying Chevron's first step, the Court determined that the language
of the proviso was ambiguous and noted that Section 1008 of the Act was
silent with respect to the particular questions raised by the regulations. 6
The Court then turned to the second step of Chevron and looked to the
legislative history of the Act, which gave no indication of Congress's intent
regarding the bounds of permissible abortion counseling and referral by
Title X programs. 7 Finding both the statutory language and legislative
history unenlightening, the Court emphasized that under Chevron, it was
required to defer to the agency.1 Finally, it concluded that the agency
justified the change in its interpretation of the statute because the Secretary
"determined that the new regulations are more in keeping with the original
intent of the statute, are justified by client experience under the prior
policy, and are supported by a shift in attitude against the 'elimination of
unborn children by abortion.'" 9 Thus, not only did the Court allow the
agency to engage in regulation aimed primarily at appeasing a special
interest group, but it also explicitly accepted the agency's assertion that
political attitudes had changed as a valid justification for the agency action.
II. A Critical Evaluation of the Chevron Two-Step
Chevron, as applied by the more deferential judges, implements the
pluralistic vision of the administrative state in its full glory. More active
judges have attempted to preserve a greater judicial role when applying
Chevron by attempting to find clarity in even blurry statutory
114. See Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 103, at 2922-46.
115. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991).
116. Id. at 184 (noting that the languageof the Act simply "does not speak directly to the issues
of counseling, referral, advocacy, or program integrity").
117. The Supreme Court agreed with every other court that examined the legislative history that
the history was ambiguous with respect to Congress's intent about the Act's abortion counseling,
referrals, and advocacy provisions. Id. at 185 (citing Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 62 (Ist Cir. 1990), vacated sub noma. Sullivan v. Massachusetts, 500 U.S. 949
(1991); Planned Parenthood Federation of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990),
vacated, 500 U.S. 949 (1991); New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1989), afftd, 500
U.S. 173 (1991)). In addition to being ambiguous, the legislative history is anachronistic because the
proviso was enacted prior to the Supreme Court's recognition of a woman's right to an abortion in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Discussion of the proviso thus reflected an understanding about
government's role in restricting abortion that Roe rendered illegitimate shortly after Title X took effect.
118. Rust, 500 U.S. at 187.
119. Id. (quoting Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 103, at 2944).
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provisions. 120 Neither the deferential nor the active approach,"
however, provides a prudent method for judicial review of agencies'
interpretations of statutes.
A. A Critique of the Deferential Application of Chevron
The problems with the deferential approach to applying Chevron stem
from difficulties with its pluralistic underpinnings. On the one hand, the
pluralistic model of the administrative state is overly optimistic about the
ability of political markets to achieve the optimal equilibrium of gov-
ernment-provided benefits." On the other hand, the pluralistic model
is too pessimistic in assuming that the political community can never
transcend individual self-interest to construct some consensus about the
public good."2 Pluralism thus limits the possible political outcomes to
an impoverished set that excludes government action aimed at fostering a
politically defined public interest.
1. Failures of the pluralistic political market.-Public choice theory
reveals that the political marketplace that pluralists envision is woefully
imperfect. The economics of political organization push the pluralistic
process to favor values held very strongly by a few individuals and to
disfavor values held in moderation by many individuals!' 4 Educating
citizens who share diffused values, coordinating their political responses,
and monitoring them to avoid free riders may entail great costs to each
120. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 307 (noting that courts resolve conflicts involving the meaning
of statutory provisions through statutory interpretation, even when a search for congressional intent is
fitile).
121. The approaches to applying Chevron that I call "deferential" and "active," others have
labeled as the "strong" and "weak" readings of Chevron. E.g., Pierce, supra note 8, at 302; Panel
Discussion, supra note 4, at 367 (comments of Cass Sunstein).
122. See ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 22 (noting that interest groups face a "prisoners' dilemma"
that results in their seeking regulatory benefits despite the fact that by doing so, interest groups bear
greater costs than thebenefits they receive); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyondthe Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1545-46 (1988) (arguing against reliance on the majoritarian political process to achieve
sought-after benefits).
123. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1534 ("Not only may regulation correct imperfections in
the market's ordering of private preference, it may also legitimately embody the community's collective
desires."); see also ROBERT P. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 190-93 (1968) (demonstrating
that there can be a public interest other than a summation of private interests); Sunstein, supra note
122, at 1545 (arguing that pluralistic theory cannot justify, among other things, prohibitions on
discrimination or certain environmental measures, broadcasting regulations, or welfare expenditures
because they may reflect private interests rather than aggregate societal preferences).
124. FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 16, at 23; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 48 (1965); see also WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO
WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN DIMOCRACY 108-09 (1992) (lamenting that
under the pluralist understanding of government, "the New Deal has been stood on its head and now
the weak and unorganized segments of society are the principal victims").
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citizen in the group."z An individual will not participate in the organi-
zation if these costs exceed the value he attaches to the favorable political
outcome the organization can secure. 12 These per capita costs of organi-
zing decrease as the size of the group decreases, and the per capita benefits
of organizing increase as the importance of the outcome to group members
increases.127 Thus, left unchecked, pluralistic politics tend to encourage
regulators to generate "monopoly rents" for focused special interest groups
even if the cost to the rest of society far exceeds the total social benefit that
these groups derive.12
In addition, the ability of a group to deliver votes depends on the
wealth of the group's supporters and their control over the institutions of
power such as the media and local political organizations. Political
outcomes thus tend to reflect more than the number of individuals who
desire the outcome and the intensity with which they desire it; outcomes
also depend on the class and background of those who desire the re-
sult. 29 The propensity of free, pluralistic markets to generate monopoly
125. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor Political Influence,
98 QJ. EcON. 371, 372-73 (1983) (discussing the large expenditures required to assert political
pressure); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 36 (1991) (noting that because influencing the political process requires time and money,
groups may "refuse to incur those petitioning costs"); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,231
(1986) (observing that free-rider problems prevent the dissemination of information about legislative
issues to the public, resulting in the passage of special interest legislation); Stigler, supra note 77, at
11-12 (stating that a voter's expenditureto educate herself on the issues and to express preferences will
be determined by the expected costs and returns and that such costs are higher in the political arena
than in the private marketplace).
126. Elhauge, supra note 125, at 36.
127. See OLSON, supra note 124, at 22-23 ("An individual will get some share of the total gain
to the group, a share that depends upon the number in the group and upon how much the individual
will benefit from that good in relation to the others in the group.'); Elhauge, supra note 125, at 36-39
(discussing the fact that large groups with diffuse interests face greater "collective action obstacles"
than smaller groups with more concentrated interests).
128. For a description of monopoly rents and discussion of the problems they create, see JAMES
Q. WILSON, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 369 (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1980) (warning that whenever a prospective policy offers concentrated benefits with widely
distributed costs, absent the presence of a watchdog organization, industries expecting to benefit from
the policy will form lobbies to secure "subsides and regulations that, in effect, spare them the full
rigors of economic competition"); James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD
A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 8-9 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (stating that
government piecemeal regulation encourages attempts to capture monopoly rents that in turn produce
social waste); Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 291, 301-02 (1974) (arguing that monopoly rent seeking can result in a "vicious circle" in which
market inequalities created by government regulations can create a political consensus to intervene
further in the market, which invites increased rent seeking, until "the market fails to perform its
allocative function to any satisfactory degree'); Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum
Game, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, supra, at 24-30 (discussing the costs
imposed by rent seeking).
129. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 53-55 (1985) (describing the
ways in which unequal ownership and control of economic enterprises can lead to political inequality).
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rents and to favor the wealthy and powerful translates into a bias against
the mainstream citizenry who share widely held but not deeply felt values
and especially into a bias against the poor and under-represented."
Because of Chevron's implicit faith in pluralistic politics, it fails to
correct these imperfections in the political processes. By focusing the
judicial inquiry on the express language of the statute that speaks to the
precise question raised by the agency interpretation, a strict application of
Chevron would result in a reviewing court's finding that most statutes are
either ambiguous or silent."' The court would then be constrained to
affirm an agency decision so long as the agency gave some nonludicrous
explanation for its decision, regardless of whether that explanation is well
reasoned or justified in terms of the public interest. 32 Consequently, the
Chevron doctrine entirely fails to check political deal-making that results
in statutory interpretations aimed at appeasing strong interest groups,3
which on the whole redounds to the detriment of society's less affluent
citizens.134
130. The same bias pervades economic markets. It is expected, however, that money will
influence economic markets, but money's influence on the political process would, I think, undermine
most citizens' sense ofjustice and democracy. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, In Pursuit ofa Bigger Pie: Can
Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 671, 677-84 (1980) (arguing that an economic
approach to balancing competing interests prevents proper dispensation ofjustice due to its bias against
the poor); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
227, 240-42 (1980) (objecting to the use of the wealth maximization principle because of its incoher-
ence and its moral objectionability). The influence of wealth, power, and "leisure time" on politics
would be acceptable only if one assumes that their unequal distribution does not "excessively" affect
the propensity of a group to expend time and money to influence political outcomes. See Elbauge,
supra note 125, at 36 ("[lI]f one assumes that skewed distributions of leisure time and money do not
excessively distort a group's willingness to expend time and money, then such a willingness could be
taken as an appropriate proxy for the degree of a group's interest.").
131. As Judge Buckley aptly stated: "[S]ome will find ambiguity even in a 'No Smoking' sign
...." UAW v. General Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1575 (D.C. Cir.) (Buckley, J.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); see also Merrill, supra note 5, at 990-91 (arguing that a strict
application of Chevron would "mark a major shift of interpretive power toward the executive branch"
and require great judicial deference because of the rare likelihood that Congress had considered the
issue being litigated); Panel Discussion, supra note 9, at 126 (comments of Judge Stephen Williams)
(asserting that Chevron turns "everything over to an agency unless Congress has spoken to the issue
unambiguously or the agency has taken leave of its senses").
132. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
133. The deferential Chevron framework deems illegitimate the reliance ofjudges on overriding
goals they glean from a statute, as such reliance fails to respect the legislative compromises between
various competing factions. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts:
Twenty Years of Law and Politics, LAW& CONTEmP. PRoBs., Autumn 1991, at 249, 291 (noting that
courts must defer to agencies in order to avoid tearing apart legislative compromise). Thus, the sup-
porters of the deferential approach explicitly reject the notion that the courts' interpretive function is
to limit monopoly rents that would otherwise be generated by legislative deal-making. See Macey,
supra note 125, at 226 (explaining the "legislation-as-contract" method of statutory interpretation as
a deferential approach that explicitly seeks to enforce the terms of deals between interest groups and
the legislature).
134. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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Rust v. Sullivan is again illustrative. Considered from the pluralistic
perspective, the fact that the gag rule was motivated primarily by interest
group politics renders it praiseworthy. Unfortunately, however, the
outcome was not the stable political equilibrium for which pluralistic
democracy strives; instead, the regulations were immediately assailed as
out of touch with the values of mainstream America.135 In fact, the
regulations were so inconsistent with mainstream values that Congress, a
body noted for its inertia and inability to act expediently on all but the most
pressing problems,136 quickly passed a bill overruling the regulations. 37
Despite this strong reaction, President Bush vetoed the bill. 3 ' Only the
election of President Clinton and a quick "Presidential Memorandum"
managed to suspend the operation of these regulations.'39
One might argue that the ultimate outcome in Rust demonstrates that
the political system works to achieve the ultimate political equilibrium. I
am not so sanguine. The presidential election hinged primarily on eco-
nomic issues.""4 Although abortion was a significant campaign issue,"'
135. See, e.g., John H. Chafee, Congress Should Remedy the Court's Decision: Withholding
Information from Low-Income Pregnant Women Is Wrong, WASH. POST, June 7, 1991, at A23; Adam
Clymer, Politicians Take Up the Domestic Issues: Polls Suggest Why, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at
E5 (noting that the public opposes the gag rule "by a whopping 71 to 23 percent margin"); Renu
Sehgal, Abortion Advice OK'd in House Spending Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 1991, at C1 (quoting
the president of Planned Parenthood as saying the vote reflects the "simple political reality that the
great majority of American society finds the gag rule intolerable").
136. Martin H. Redish & TheodoreT. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REv. 803, 836 (1994) (com-
menting that legislative inertia is inherent in the political process and "severely limits Congress's ability
to bring outdated statutes in line with the times").
137. H.R. 2707, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Philip J. Hilts, Abortion Counseling Ban Is
Rejected by Senate, 72-25, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at BS; see also Greene, supra note 14, at 182-
84 (describing presidential and congressional reactions to Rust, and concluding that the entire episode
demonstrates how current legal doctrine has granted the executive branch extraordinary lawmaking
power).
138. Adam Clymer, President Vetoes Bill on Abortion: Override Bid Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
1991, at Al. Even President Bush seemed to recognize that the Reagan administration had miscal-
culated the public reaction to the gag rule. In response to widespread concern about the rule's
implication for the doctor-patient relationship, he directed the Secretary of HHS to allow doctors in
Title X programs to discuss abortion with their patients. National Family Planning & Reproductive
Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This directive, however, was over-
turned by the D.C. Circuit as an amendment of the rule made without proper notice and comment
procedures. Id. at 241-42.
139. Presidential Memorandum, The Title X "Gag Rule," 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993).
140. Bill McAllister, Presidential Race Looks Tougheras Bush Vows Upset, Clinton Rallies Labor,
Perot Set to Stump, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1992, at Al.
141. Ruth Marcus, On Supportfor Choice and Limits, Bush-Clinton Contrasts Are Sharp, WASH.
POST, Aug. 16, 1992, at A21. But see Timothy M. Phelps, Campaign '92 High Court Campaign Issue
That Wasn't the Supreme Court's Future: Shhhhh, It's a Secret, NWSDAY, Oct. 30, 1992, at 17
(recognizing that while the presidential election had the potential of either consolidating an ultra-
conservative majority or liberalizing the Court with respect to abortion rights, neither presidential
candidate made this topic an election issue).
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voter attention focused primarily on the implications of future Supreme
Court appointments for the continued viability of Roe v. Wade; 42 there
is no evidence indicating that the gag rule played more than a tangential
role in President Clinton's election. In short, the reversal of these
politically unpopular regulations was serendipitous and not the result of a
political process that necessarily protects against such unpopular out-
comes. 
1 43
The outcome of the Title X regulations also illustrates how the politi-
cal aspects of the administrative process are likely to disfavor the poor and
politically disenfranchised. Although these regulations raised the ire of
many pro-choice citizens, they affected directly only those dependent on
federally subsidized family planning and health care. Women with per-
sonal primary-care physicians do not need the information and referrals
from Title X projects; they can get that information from their own
doctors. But women who fall outside the private health-care system-
single women who are not regularly employed or married women whose
spouses are also not regularly employed, in short, women who form much
of the permanent underclass in American society-have no alternatives to
subsidized family planning and health programs. These were the citizens
for whom the change in policy threatened loss of choice and delay in
obtaining pre-natal and abortion services which in turn greatly increase the
health risks associated with pregnancy.1
2. Pluralism's failure to seek consensus on government policy.-
Pluralistic democracy also limits political outcomes to an impoverished set
of bargains struck by interest groups seeking to maximize satisfaction of
their ex ante political desires. It is a politics of coalition-building and deal-
making in which the overall satisfaction of the political community and the
142. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Tony Mauro, Direction of Court Key Issue for Voters, USA
TODAY, June 9, 1992, at 8A (noting that although Supreme Court Justices rarely loom as a campaign
issue, the possible impact of a substantial number of new Justices on key areas such as abortion rights
presents a major issue for pre-election debate).
143. Judging from the reaction to President Clinton's memorandum suspending the gag rule, the
rules were not a pressing issue among any major segment of the polity. See Amy Goldstein & Richard
Morin, Clinton Cancels Abortion Restrictions of Reagan-Bush Era, WASH. PosT, Jan. 23, 1993, at Al
(quoting anti-abortion protestors' lack of concern for the repeal of the gag rule in comparison to other
abortion restrictions that were lifted by President Clinton).
144. See Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the New Undue Burden
Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269 JAMA 2249, 2249, 2254 (1993) (noting the effect of
abortion restrictions, including the health risks posed by delayed abortions, disproportionately affects
.young, poor, minority, and rural women"); Christine L. Young et al., Psychosocial Concerns of
Women Who Delay Prenatal Care, 71 FAMIUES IN SOC'Y: J. CONTEMP. HUM. SERVICES, 408, 408-09
(1990) (describing the risks posed by delayed prenatal care and noting that such risks are particularly
great for poor, minority women).
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wisdom of the political outcome do not matter. 45 As such, pluralistic
democracy tends to preclude outcomes that reflect consensus among dif-
ferent groups willing to listen open-mindedly and empathetically to others
within the political community.'46 This limitation bodes ill for adminis-
trative policy, because agencies pursuing purely political ends often ignore
approaches that in the long run might better serve the interests of all
members of society. 47
Returning to Rust, a careful reading of HHS's explanation indicates
that the agency considered Section 1008 of Title X as embodying two
purposes. First, HHS explicitly read Section 1008 to mean that federal
funds were not to be used by programs that intentionally encourage abor-
tions as a method of family planning."' Second, and more controver-
sially, the agency implicitly treated the statute and legislative history as
aimed at preventing Title X programs from operating in any manner that
would increase the likelihood that a pregnant client would choose an
abortion.!49 Neither purpose, however, automatically justified the ban on
nondirective abortion counseling. More importantly, HHS never justified
its adoption of the more speculative second purpose. Faced with an
ambiguous statute, the agency merely asserted that its reading was more
145. See Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 133, at 305 (describing the legislative process as
congressional "dealmaking," resulting in ambiguous policies and purposes that hinder judicial
interpretation).
146. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1507, 1507-08 (1988) (describ-
ing a premise of pluralism as "deep mistrust of people's capacities to communicate persuasively to one
another their diverse normative experiences ... that move each other's views on disputed normative
issues towards felt (not merely strategic) agreement without deception, coercion or other manipulation"
(emphasis in original)); Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1554-55 (noting that, unlike republicanism,
pluralism treats "the notion of a common good [as] . . . alternatively mystical or tyrranical"); cf.
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAw 58 (1988) ("Liberal epistemology holds that one
cannot resolve such differences rationally [e.g., through discourse].").
147. For example, pluralistic theory cannot justify government redistribution of wealth to those
with less overall economic and political power. Incorporating some notion of public good as the goal
of government action, however, allows for such redistribution. See ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 31
(arguing that the "public goods theory" can be used to justify wealth redistribution); James S. Liebman,
Desegregating Politics: 'All-Out' School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1545
(1990) ("Moreover, when parties to the consensus insist that the government afford all citizens equal
concern and respect, they generally seem to mean that the government, when it sets about distributing
scarce resources, should accord each person equal status as a human being precisely because each
person is, equally, a potential creator of his or her own valid good and because each heterogenous
person's self-defined good is equally worthy of governmental attention and protection.").
148. Abortion CounselingRegulations, supra note 103, at 2922 (quoting the conference report on
Title X, which stated that "[ilt is... the intent of both Houses that the funds authorized be used only
to support preventive family planning" (emphasis in original) (quoting H.R. CONF. REI. No. 1667,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5080, 5081)).
149. For example, in explaining its decision to adopt regulations amending the previous guidelines,
UHS asserted that the policy behind § 1008 "is that abortion is not to be encouraged or promoted in
any way." Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 103, at 2923 (emphasis added).
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consistent with congressional intent and failed to consider open-mindedly
the policy implications of the gag rule's discouragement of abortion.1"
HHS reported no data indicating that nondirective counseling resulted
in any increase in the costs of Title X programs. Perhaps abortion-related
information is easily incorporated into the general information regarding
prenatal care given to pregnant women who seek the aid of federally
subsidized family-planning centers, so that the provision of such informa-
tion would not increase program costs. If so, then nondirective counseling
would not conflict with the statutory purpose of preventing the intentional
use of federal funds to encourage abortion. Similarly, HHS had no factual
basis for concluding that nondirective counseling would necessarily result
in an increase in abortions. Neutral provision of information might be just
as likely to discourage as to encourage a pregnant woman to seek an abor-
tion.151 Moreover, if neutral provision of information did increase the
number of women electing abortion, that would merely reflect the choices
of a more informed clientele, and would not indicate that the program itself
had encouraged these choices.
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of HHS's decision was the
Department's abdication of its responsibility for assessing the policy
implications of the regulations. Opponents of the proposed regulations
expressed concern that the rules would delay the abortion procedure for
clients who ultimately decide to terminate .their pregnancy. 52 Critics
asserted that delays can significantly increase the health risks associated
with abortion. 53 Certainly it is not the goal of any interest group merely
to delay abortions until a point in the pregnancy when they are less safe.
Yet, in response to this, concern, the Department merely contended that
Section 1008 prohibited it from taking any other position, for to do so
would constitute the illegal facilitation of abortion."5 Thus, instead of
150. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991) (noting that the Secretary of HHS "deter-
mined that the new regulations are more in keeping with the original intent of the statute, are justified
by client experience under the prior policy, and are supported by a shift in attitude against 'the
elimination of unborn children by abortion'" (quoting Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note
103, at 2944)).
151. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2841 (1992) (noting that providing
women with information enhances decisionmaking).
152. Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 103, at 2936.
153. Id.; Catherine G. Schmidt, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection and the Abortion Rights
of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 597, 605 (1993).
154. Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 103, at 2938. HHS also stated that in some
instances delay is beneficial because it allows the client "sufficient time for reflection prior to making
an informed decision." Id. This response, in addition to failing to address concerns about health risks,
ignores the reality that delay at a point when the pregnant woman does not have information about the
abortion option is not likely to result in meaningful reflection and an informed decision. HHS's
statement also ignores the fact that most women agonize about the abortion decision without needing
any additional delays provided by bans on Title X programs providing information.
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guiding its interpretation by the concerns of the polity and its expert
evaluation of those concerns, HHS relied on its politically pre-ordained
reading of the statute to avoid addressing the policy concerns of pro-choice
comments in the rule-making proceeding.
HHS's justification for the gag rule did address one policy concern.
The Department noted that its previous policy had led to abuses, which
prompted some women who regretted their abortion decisions to charge
that Title X programs had encouraged or even coerced them to terminate
their pregnancies.155 Stories of such abuses do indicate a tension between
the manner in which HHS had previously implemented Title X and the
accepted first purpose of Section 1008. But HHS did not explain why it
could not relieve this tension by trying to cure the abuses without ignoring
the concerns of pro-choice groups. In other words, HHS addressed only
the concerns that were expressed by the interest group that the new rules
were intended to serve and claimed that its hands were tied with regard to
any other concerns. Yet, the Supreme Court's extremely deferential
approach to the reasonableness step of the Chevron doctrine lauded the
agency for its explanation that "prior policy failed-to implement properly
the statute."156 Such an explanation merely justifies an inquiry into new
rules and does not justify the wholesale revisions adopted by HHS. In
essence, the deferential approach to the Chevron doctrine encouraged the
agency to perform an incomplete and one-sided policy analysis rather than
genuinely to try to reconcile the statute with the concerns of the affected
public.157
B. Problems with the Active Approach to Chevron
Unfortunately, the active approach to Chevron does not alleviate the
problems of the deferential approach without creating problems of its own.
Under the active approach, courts view their role as one of resolving
ambiguities to the extent possible before reaching the deferential second
155. Id. at 2923-25. HHS cited particular examples of Title X providers failing to give any
balanced discussion of options and characterizing the fetus as "a lump of tissue," "fetal tissue," or
"uterine contents." It noted that several women subjected to such treatment had commented that "they
were given no counseling at the time they made their decision to abort as to the remorse and guilt they
might later feel." Id. at 2924.
156. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991).
157. In fact, the agency's decision concludes its discussion of HHS's basis for the rules with the
statement: "The Department, accordingly, concludes that there is an adequate basis for this rule since
it is reasonable in light of all circumstances." Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 103, at
2925. The decision then cites Chevron. Thus, the message that the Department infers from judicial
review under Chevron is that it need find only some rational basis for its decision and that it need not
concern itself with the wisdom of its interpretation or the policy concerns that its interpretation
generates.
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step of the Chevron doctrine.15 Thus, when the language of the statu-
tory provision does not provide a clear answer to the precise issue the
agency decided, active reviewing courts look at the structure of the statute
and its relation to other statutes." 9 Some may also consult announced
statutory purposes or scour the legislative history to infer how Congress
would have acted had it considered the precise question.1" In addition,
active courts may invoke traditional canons of statutory interpretation to
read a single meaning into an otherwise ambiguous statute."'
In its extreme form, the active approach to Chevron re-establishes the
judiciary as the institution primarily responsible for interpreting the law.
The reviewing court will first use all the traditional techniques 62 for
determining "Congress's will," and if it comes to a clear conclusion about
that will as applied to the particular situation, it need never-consider the
agency's interpretation."e The agency interpretation warrants judicial
deference only when the nature of the issue leaves the court uncertain about
its reading of the statute.
The problems with the active approach to Chevron stem from flaws in
the transmission-belt and expertise models. As does the transmission-belt
model, the active approach thrusts the court into the debate about policy
under the guise of ensuring that agencies do not deviate from congressional
158. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
159. E.g., Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1751 (1994); American
Hasp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608-14 (1991); United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 9 F.3d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
160. E.g., Contract Courier Servs., Inc. v. Research&Special Programs Admin., 924 F.2d 112,
114-15 (7th Cir. 1991); Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals&TheirEnvironmentv. Lujan, 911
F.2d 117, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1554-55 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Bresgal
v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1987); Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC,
826 F.2d 1074, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913 (1988).
161. See, e.g., Estate of Thompsonv. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We
start our analysis.., where we properly should, the languageof the statute itself."); Bresgal, 843 F.2d
at 1166 ("In construing a statute... the Court looks first to the language of the statute itself, then to
its legislative history, and then to the interpretation given to it by its administering agency. At all
times, however, the goal is to determine congressional intent." (citation omitted)); Griffon v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d 146, 152, 152-55 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he canons
of retroactive construction themselves provide the artillery for our assault on the walls that hide
congressional intent.").
162. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTs REVoLUTION 112-37 (1990) (describing
and criticizing techniques courts use to determine the will of the enacting legislature).
163. Wassenaar v. Office of Personnel Management, 21 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (con-
struing the statute without regard to the agency interpretation because inflexible application of the
agency reading of the statute could lead to absurd results); Colorado ex rel. Colorado State Banking
Bd. v. RTC, 926 F.2d 931, 950 (10th Cir. 1991) (Ebel, J., dissenting) (opining that the court should
not follow the agency interpretation of the McFadden Act because that interpretation violates canons
of statutory interpretation); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (rejecting EPA's definition of solid waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
which had included material reused in an ongoing production process, because one of Congress's
purposes in adopting the Act included encouraging recycling).
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will or from determining the plain meaning of the statutory text. When,
however, an active reviewing court cannot discern a plain meaning or
legislative will that sheds light on questions before it, the court simply
leaps to the other extreme, completely abandoning its law-declaring role
and leaving the agency with unfettered discretion to interpret the sta-
tute.'" Thus, under the active approach, some courts usurp the agency's
policy-formulating function while others totally abdicate their responsibility
to check unreasoned agency decisionmaking.
1. Fictitious congressional will and politically unaccountable
courts.-The active approach to Chevron stems from the traditional legal
notion that courts are responsible for declaring what the law is.'"
Because courts are the least politically responsive branch, however, they
must not substitute their political judgments or value choices for those of
the legislature when interpreting a statute." Hence, the court must
justify its interpretation by explicit reference to the language, structure, and
purpose of the statute, as well as to any background norms of which
Congress presumably was aware when it enacted the statute."6 In other
words, active courts seek to determine the legislative will embodied in a
statute when they interpret it. 168
164. The reasons that courts abdicate their law-declaring role are different under the expertise
model and under Chevron. Under the expertise understanding of agencies, courts naively trust that the
agency will determine the best outcome by applying its technical expertise and professional ethic.
Although the Chevron doctrine does not naively presume that agencies make decisions as would a group
of nonpolitical professionals, it blindly relies on agencies' greater political accountability as its basis
for trusting agency interpretations of statutes. The bottom line, however, is the same: The courts leave
unchecked the influence of a potentially biased political market.
165. This notion can be traced back to the admonitionof Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803), that "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is." However, as Professor Monaghan noted, this notion is not necessarily inconsistent with
deferential review of agency statutory interpretation:
The court's task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority .... [T]he judicial role
is to specify what the statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all that
it does mean. In this context, the court is not abdicating its constitutional duty to "say
what the law is" by deferring to agency interpretations ....
Monaghan, supra note 14, at 27-28.
166. See Lino A. Graglia, 'Interpreting' the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1019, 1021 (1992) (noting that judicial activism is wrong because it is equivalent to government by
judges who are not subject to electoral control).
167. See Eskridge, supra note 69, at 641 ("Given our society's commitment to representative
democracy, the legislative background of statutes seems like an acceptable source of context."); Earl
M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist
Approach, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1988) (asserting that all theories of statutory interpretation which
fail to give dispositive weight to legislative intent are inconsistent with the principle of legislative
supremacy); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 24-27 (1985) (asserting that the legitimacy of lawmaking by federal courts is limited by the principle
of electoral accountability, in which public policy is made by elected officials).
168. See Eskridge, supra note 69, at 626 ("[T]he Court views its role as implementing the original
intent or purpose of the enacting Congress.'). Many commentators distinguish between legislative
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Unfortunately, legislative will is usually more of a fiction than a fact.
It is an artifice that the legal system creates in order to lend coherence to
the often fractured product of an unruly legislative process. 169  Congres-
sional adoption of a statute usually requires legislators to build a coalition
of interest groups that may have different or even conflicting statutory
goals." Hence, the language of a statute may purposely be left vague,
and legislative history will often reflect two or more "intents" that may
lead to different interpretations within the context of a specific contro-
versy.171 Such vagueness provides great leeway for a court to find a
intent 'vith respect to a specific controversy .and ,more general legislative purposes. See, e.g.,
SUNSrIN, supra note 162, at 127 (differentiating between ascertaining "a general legislative aim or
purpose" and "how the enacting legislature wanted the [specific] question to be resolved"); William
Popkin, Foreword: Non-Judicial Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 307 (1990)
(discussing the problem of specific statements in legislative history). My notion of legislative will
includes both specific intent and general purposes, unless otherwise stated.
169. This artificial nature of "legislative will" provided the focus of significant legal realist
criticism. See, e.g., William R. Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 14, 17, 14-17 (1965) ("[Legislative history will represent the position of only a very
small portion of the lawmaking body.... [T]he lazy judge is likely to take the legislative history as
an excuse for foregoing the difficult problems of statutory analysis which it is his responsibility to
meet."); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870, 869-70 (1930) ("On this
transparent and absurd fiction it ought not be necessary to dwell.... A legislature certainly has no
intention whatever in connectionwith words which some two or three men drafted, [a] number rejected,
and [many had] differing ideas and beliefs."). The realist skepticism about the existence of any true
legislative intent has enjoyed a recent revival. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,
50 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 533, 547 (1983) ("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have
'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet discoverable."); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279, 279-80 (1985) (proclaiming that objective interpretivism is
not helpful to legal reasoning).
170. See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
441, 446-47 (1990) ("Statutes are drafted by multiple persons, often with conflicting objectives.");
Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 380-81 (illustrating the
compromise involved in the passage of a particular strip-mining law and the resulting ambiguities that
stumped the courts).
171. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 320-21 (1986) (lamenting the difficulties of ascertain-
ing "some composite group intention"); Easterbrook, supra note 170, at 446-47 (noting that no single
objective will be determinable because a statute has multiple drafters); see also Pierce, supra note 8,
at 313 (contending that when Congress chooses not to resolve a particular policy issue in legislation,
an administrative agency can change its interpretation of the law in accordance with the political
philosophy of each President). In fact, legislators and their staff members often play a game of
inserting comments into the legislative history with the hope of getting courts to adopt their preferred
reading, or at least to counter legislators representing other interest groups in the coalition from doing
the same. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (claiming
that the cases cited in the legislative history on which the Court relied were probably inserted by a
congressional staffer and did not represent the informed intent of Congress); Popkin, supra note 168,
at 312 ("[Tjhe secretive and staff-dominated process of creating legislative history might be more
amenable to private interest group pressure than the process of writing legislation."); Kenneth W. Starr,
Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376, 376-77 ("Lobbyists
maneuver to get their clients' opinions into the mass of legislative materials; judges in turn, may be
tempted to use the convenient tool of legislative history as an escape from the hard work of actual
judging."); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read:
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congressional "will" consistent with the judge's personal values and
politics."7 Hence, the active search for an often fictitious congressional
will often engenders the court's substituting its values for those promoted
by the agency's interpretation. 1 3
In some cases, judges may have no better option than to rely on the
concept of legislative intent, even if that concept remains hazy and
amorphous. Judicial determination of congressional intent, and at a
broader level statutory purpose, can provide some guidance to the inter-
preter about how to apply a statute whose text does not resolve the precise
issue before her.174 And, to some extent, careful use of legislative
history to construct congressional will constrains the interpreter from
reading her personal preferences into the statute. 75 But, when an agency
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321, 341-42
(1990) (noting the abuses inherent in the planned "colloquy" between congressmen who know that their
comments will affect judicial interpretation).
172. I do not mean to suggest that the courts I have labelled "active" seek to impose their own
values when interpreting statutes. Rather, I think judges, like most people, are apt to find a clear
meaning consistent with their views of how the world should operate, when others with different views
would find ambiguity or a different "clear meaning."
173. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (likening the citation of legislative history to
"looking over a crowd and picking out your friends"). Jonathon Macey has objected to this critique,
arguing that special interest groups havean incentive to hide their real legislative agendas behind public
interest justifications. Macey, supra note 125, at 251. For Macey, having the courts enforce the
announced purposes of a statute provides a check on legislation that often represents unjustified political
deals that favor special interest groups. Id. at 254. Although Macey persuasively points out the need
for courts to consider announced legislative purposes when interpreting statutes, his analysis does not
balance this need against the costs of inexpert and unaccountable courts imposing their views about
legislative purpose on agencies. Such a balancing suggests to me the need for courts to bring these
considerations to bear without definitively imposing their interpretation on an agency.
174. For "intentionalists," legislative history sheds light on how the enacting Congress might have
resolved the issue had it been confronted with it. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of
Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAw & CoNrnFMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 14-
15 (claiming that interpreting statutes in accordance with the intent of the enacting legislature provides
stability of statutory policy that both citizens and legislators are likely to prefer); Richard A. Posner,
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 179, 190 (1986) (suggesting that judges confronted with ambiguous statutes should ask
what the framers would have wanted them to do); cf. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,220,220-21 (1980) (describing and critiquing the inten-
tionalist interpreter's attempts "to translate the adopters' intentions into the present in order to apply
them to the question at issue"). For "normativists," legislative debates reveal "meta-intent"-legis-
latora' insights whose value survives changes in the particular context within which the legislators may
have envisioned the statute applying. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66
CHI.-KENT L. Rsv. 365, 418-19 (1990) (describing the normativist belief that legislative history has
a truth value which may be useful in determining not the absolutely true meaning of a statute, but the
best meaning for a particular case).
175. See Popkin, supra note 168, at 316 (suggesting that clear statements in the legislative history
provide significant evidence of statutory meaning without allowing a court to mold legislative history
to justify a preferred interpretation); cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 162, at 128 ("Without reference to the
[legislative] history, interpretation can become less bounded."). Obviously, I am not sympathetic to
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administers a regulatory scheme, legislative intent seems too tenuous a
concept for reviewing courts to use at Chevron's step one to exclude
entirely the more technically expert and politically accountable agency from
the interpretive process. 176
Again, Rust vividly illustrates how the active approach allows judges
to rely on their personal politics to decide statutory issues without paying
any heed to agency interpretations. The dissent in Rust would have in-
voked the canon that, to the extent possible, statutes should be construed
to avoid serious doubt regarding their constitutionality.177 Finding the
HHS interpretation of Section 1008 constitutionally suspect, the dissent
would have reversed the regulation and left Congress with the task of
making "explicit and unambiguous" any legislative intent to burden the
speech interests of Title X project physicians and the privacy interests of
pregnant clients.1 7  The majority, however, easily sidestepped this issue;
for the five Justices who joined the opinion of the Court, "the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary [did] not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful
constitutional questions' ... that would lead [these Justices] to assume
the formalist critique that reliance on anything other than statutory text allows judicial usurpation of
the legislative policymaking function. For examples of this critique, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal
Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 92 (1984) (concluding
that the intentionalist approach must fail because it is impossible for judges to know what 535 legis-
lators would do if faced with a question they did not consider); Starr, supra note 171, at 376, 379
(reflecting the view that the use of legislative history allows courts to enter the political process by
selecting which voice in a political debate to emphasize).
176. Agencies are more expert and more accountablethan courts not only in the traditional senses
of technical knowledge and non-life-tenured appointments, but more significantly because of their
"closeness to the legislative process, continued involvement [in this process], and responsibility [for
administering the statute]." Strauss, supra note 171, at 346.
177. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,204 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that while
the majority does not dispute this canon of construction, it refuses to apply it). Some commentators
would distinguish between judicial use of canons of interpretation and legislative history in interpreting
statutes. E.g., Eskridge, supra note 69, at 663-64. To the extent that some canons, such as "the
inclusion of the one is the exclusion of another," reflect logical uses of language and commonly held
norms of grammar, one might reasonably assume that Congress acted consistently with these canons
in fashioning legislation. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 927-28 (1992) (defending the use of canons as simply expressions of a drafter's
likely natural tendencies); see also Marshall J. Breger, Introductory Remarks to Conference on Statutory
Interpretation: The Role of Legislative History in Judicial Interpretation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 362, 365-70
(distinguishing between canons that are used in interpreting legislative intent when the statutory
language is unclear and canons that are used when the statute is silent as to the problem at hand). But
the canon at issue in Rust-that the court should interpret statutes to avoid deciding difficult consti-
tutional issues-is, in all likelihood, not one to which Congress paid any attention when it passed
§ 1008 of Title X. Cf Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PrT. L. REv. 627, 629
(1987) ("When I was in Congress the only 'canons' we talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought
that could not shoot straight.").
178. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is both logical and eminently
prudent to assume that when Congress intends to press the limits of constitutionality in its enactments,
it will express that intent in explicit and unambiguous terms.").
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Congress did not intend to authorize [the regulations'] issuance."179 In
essence, the use of the canons of statutory interpretation to resolve
ambiguities in the statute permitted both the majority and the dissent to find
different meanings in line with the individual Justices' predilections about
the ability of government to restrict subsidized nondirective counseling
about abortion. Ultimately, under the active approach to Chevron, the
Court's interpretation of Congress's intent depended on the Justices'
attitudes toward abortion and state-funded family planning.
Having judges determine statutory meaning in terms of their personal
predilections is not desirable. Not only are federal judges unaccountable
to the electorate, but they also tend to hail from mainstream, middle-class
America; few come from impoverished families, relatively few are minori-
ties, and women continue to be under-represented."t Yet, personal
values often derive from cultural backgrounds and economic class."'
Hence, to the extent that a court's reading of statutory meaning reflects
personal values, judicial determinations are unlikely to comport well with
the values the entire polity would like to see supported by regulatory
Statutes.'82
One response to these concerns lies in Congress's power to override
objectionable judicial constructions of statutes. Although this can and does
occur in the most salient or egregious cases,s Congress's structure and
cumbersome legislative process render congressional oversight impractical
as the usual means of ensuring fidelity to the polity's values.'" One
179. Id. at 1771 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U.s. 366, 408 (1909)).
180. Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 661, 664, 669 (1985); see A. Leon Higgin-
botham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The American Experience and the South Africa
Challenge, 42 DUKE L.J. 1028, 1053 (1993) ("As of January 1, 1993, of the 837 authorized, active
Article II judges, blacks comprised a total of 5.1%, women 10.9%, Hispanic-Americans 3.7%, and
Asian-Americans 0.7%.").
181. Brest, supra note 180, at 664 ("Many of these characteristics [such as race and socio-
economic background] correlate with attitudes on social, political and economic issues.").
182. Cf. id. at 669 ("[Jludges' attitudes on important social and political issues do not reflect those
of the population at large.").
183. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretations Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 (1991) (listing eight cases that the 101st Congress overrode).
184. PwHIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 32 (1970);
Merrill, supra note 167, at 22-23; cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1551 (explaining why Congress
cannot regularly overcome "institutional inertia" to explicitly override agency decisions with which
legislators disagree). Studies have shown that Congress does not frequently override Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., Thomas R. Marshall, Policymaking and the Modem Court: When Do Supreme
Court Rulings Prevail?, 42 W. POL. Q. 493, 493-94, 503 (1989) (using computer models to identify
factors that explain why some Supreme Court rulings prevail and others do not). A recent study by
William Eskridge, however, disputes these findings. Eskridge, supra note 183, at 335. Eskridge
concedes, however, that "Congress tends not to be aware of [lower court decisions] and overrides a
much smaller percentage of them." Id. at 337 n. 12. Congressional oversight of agency interpretations
is more likely to work because the appropriations process and the relationship of committees to agencies
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simply cannot count on congressional oversight as the primary means to
ensure that the judiciary interprets statutes in a manner that responds to the
public's values.
2. Congressional will and the nonexpert courts.-Even when a statute
evidences a congressional understanding that an active court might use to
answer the precise question raised by an agency decision, this answer is not
always best. When considering a bill, members of Congress cannot pos-
sibly envision the myriad of real-world situations to which the statute might
apply.1" Thus, even considering the legislative history, the language,
and the structure of a statute, Congress necessarily dictates how the statute
will operate at a broader level of generality than does the agency when it
seeks to apply the statute. Although this broader level suggests an outcome
at the more particular level of application, the agency might find that a
different outcome better serves the balance of statutory goals that the public
prefers. What is more, a statute may have been passed decades earlier
when society may have viewed the various aims underlying a regulatory
scheme very differently or before Congress could have envisioned the
present situation that demands application of the statutory provisions. 86
In such a situation, an aggressive judicial search for congressional will can
constrain the expert agency to choose an interpretation at odds with the
polity's present values."
The nature of the judiciary encourages courts to impose a formalistic
reading on the agency even when that reading is bad policy. Accepted
allows Congress to influence agencies without explicitly having to adopt overriding substantive legis-
lation. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1551-52 (suggesting that the power of the purse allows
Congress to keep agencies in line with preferred policies).
185. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1480 (1987) (noting that the passage of time gives rise to unanticipated events and circumstances that
may render a statute ambiguous).
186. See id. at 1488 (discussing the Supreme Court's failure in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30
(1983), to recognize that changingpolicies underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) could alter its meaning,
and therefore that appeals to historical analysis were not instructive).
187. The problem of the static nature of statutory language has, on occasion, led courts to invoke
the canon of interpretation that they should ignore the plain meaning of a statute when that meaning
leads to absurd results or frustrates the purposes of the statute. See, e.g., Perry v. Commerce Loan
Co., 383 U.S. 392, 399 (1966) (refusing to apply the six-year ban on second bankruptcy filings to
personal payment extension plans under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Investment Bankers, Inc., 4 F.3d
1556, 1564 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a literal reading of the Securities Investor Protection Act because
amendments to the Bankruptcy Codehad rendered the plain meaning absurd), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1061 (1994). It has also prompted at least one distinguished scholar to suggest that courts should treat
old statutory prescriptions as they would common-law doctrine, feeling free to alter the prescriptions
as the judges find appropriate to better fit the modem context in which the statutory provisions apply.
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AcE OF STATUTES 81-171 (1982); see also Eskridge,
supra note 185, at 1483 (describing a process of dynamic interpretation that focuses on present circum-
stances as well as original intent).
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practice dictates that courts approach their interpretive task as diviners of
original legislative meaning.18 Although courts will take policy implica-
tions into account, these considerations enter as background influences,
while parsing the words of the statute and massaging the legislative history
remain the bread and butter of judicial statutory interpretation.'89 As
long as the courts are the statutory interpreters, this focus on legislative
intent and statutory meaning is appropriate. After all, judges have neither
the expertise nor the political accountability to justify pursuit of their inter-
pretive task primarily with an eye toward setting policy."9 But the
bottom line is that judicial inquiry overemphasizes the formalistic search
for legislative will and tends to downplay the policy implications of judicial
interpretation. A likely outcome is bad, judicially mandated public pol-
icy. 19t
3. The new textualism and active Chevron review.-Recently, some
jurists have eschewed legislative will in favor of textual approaches to
statutory interpretation."9 They contend that a body like Congress has
no singular will or intent and that the only congressional action that has
binding legal force is the enactment of specific statutory language.' 9'
188. 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTESAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 45.05
(5th ed. 1992).
189. See Eskridge, supra note 185, at 1484-97 (describing various cases in which both the
majority and dissent apply an intentionalist approach despite the unilluminating nature of that approach).
190. See Posner, supra note 174, at 200 (arguing that judges should interpret statutes as officers
should interpret commands from their superiors-with an eye toward the goals of the superiors and not
in pursuit of their own objectives). Whether the intent of the enacting legislature should be the sole
focus of courts interpreting statutes is presently a hotly debated subject. Compare Merrill, supra note
167, at 27 (arguing that separation of powers and electoral accountability limit federal courts "to
interpreting federal texts (initially understood as a search for the specific intentions of the enacting
body)") and Posner, supra note 174, at 189-90 (arguing for an interpretive framework in which judges
search to determine how the drafters of the statute would have answered a particular question) with T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 20, 49-50 (1988) (defend-
ing methods of interpretation that consider changing values and policies) and Eskridge, supra note 174,
at 415 (favoring a model of dynamic statutory interpretation).
191. A noted example of problematic judicial interference in agency policymaking occurred when
the courts read the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988), to require protection of air quality
in "clean air" areas. E.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See
generally R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COUTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
(1983) (discussing numerous court decisions regarding the Clean Air Act and concluding that the courts
do not possess the institutional capacity to efficiently formulate beneficial policy).
192. The founding of the new textualism is usually attributed to Justice Antonin Scalia and Seventh
Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook. E.g., George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other
'Benign Fictions . The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources
of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE LJ. 39, 39; Eskridge, supra note 69, at 650; Frickey, supra note
69, at 252-55. Other judges, including James Buckley of the D.C. Circuit and Alex Kozinski of the
Ninth Circuit have since joined the ranks of those skeptical about the use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes. Eskridge, supra note 69, at 646-47.
193. See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining
that courts often place too much reliance on legislative history when interpreting statutes); Frank H.
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Reliance on the text alone provides less material from which an active
court can find meaning to overcome statutory silence or to resolve statutory
ambiguity. But, as Justice Scalia has noted, less material may also mean
less evidence of conflicting meanings attributed to the statute by various
members of the enacting coalition. 1" Moreover, a creative reading of
statutory language and a detailed inquiry into statutory structure can clarify
in a particular judge's mind an otherwise hazy statute. Hence, like their
colleagues who rely on all the tools of statutory interpretation, judges who
apply the new textual learning also can take an active approach to statutory
review under Chevron.
Unfortunately, when applied to Chevron review, the new textualism
suffers from problems similar to those that plague interpretive theories
premised on legislative will. An active textual approach depends upon the
recognition in Chevron that statutory language is binding on agencies as
well as courts.195 So long as all reasonable interpreters would agree with
the creative textualist's reading of statutory language and structure, the
court may legitimately impose that reading on the agency." But the
active textualist often finds a plain meaning when other judges see a
contrary message."9
The active textual approach to Chevron engenders controversy pre-
cisely when the "plain" meaning is in dispute. In those cases, the question
the textualist must answer is not whether the statutory language binds
agencies, but rather which entity gets to pick the statute's "plain
meaning"-the administering agency or the reviewing court. Because the
interpretive process is just as likely to reflect politics and affect policy
when courts look to text as when they look to legislative will, the new
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59,
60-61 (1988) ("The words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, are the 'law.'"). For a
more complete description of Justice Scalia's textual approach to statutory interpretation, and a listing
of his opinions addressing this subject, see generally Eskridge, supra note 69, at 656, 650-56 & n.116
(noting Scalia's leadership in the development of "new textualism" and examining Scalia's critique of
the traditional approach to statutory interpretation).
194. Scalia, supra note 10, at 520-21.
195. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see Merrill, supra note 5, at 990-92 (pointing out that "Justice Scalia's 'plain meaning'
approach to statutory construction" leads to less deference to agency decisions); Scalia, supra note 10,
at 521 ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and
from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for
Chevron deference exists." (emphasis in original)).
196. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (stating that a statute's clear meaning must be adopted by
the agency enforcing the statute).
197. E.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 117,
126-29 (1985) (splitting 5-4 on whether the word "modified," as used in § 301(1) of the Clean Water
Act, is ambiguous); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1194-97 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Mikva, J., dissenting) (disagreeing on the meaning of "solid waste").
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textualism does not justify allowing courts to determine statutory meaning
any more than does the approach premised on legislative will.
Approaches that rely on text alone are no more likely to lead to wise
policy decisions than approaches based on legislative will. Often, textual
courts will focus on details of structure or particular phraseology that does
not reflect any thought about the policies underlying the statute.19
Again, the judicial propensity to use interpretive maps devoid of policy-
driven directions increases the likelihood of judicially mandated bad policy.
Thus, the new textualism, like theories premised on legislative will, fails
to justify an active judicial role at step one of the Chevron analysis.
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion199 provides a good example of an active textual approach to Chevron
that resulted in bad policy. In that case, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed a FERC order conditioning
approval of a gas company's new discounted service upon a reduction in
the company's rates to nondiscount customers.' FERC had conditioned
its approval to prevent the gas company from receiving double recovery of
capital costs jointly invested in new and existing service.21
Northern Natural Gas is unique in that the court reversed the agency
but did not use the standard technique of finding a clear congressional
intent on the precise issue at step one of Chevron. Instead, the court
admitted that Congress had not spoken directly to the precise issue,' but
nonetheless, at step two, read the structure of the Natural Gas Act to
prohibit FERC from adjusting rates for existing services as part of its
approval of new service.' The manner in which the court relied on the
general architecture of the Act to find FERC's action unlawful corresponds
to the manner in which other courts have found clarity in otherwise ambig-
uous statutes at step one of Chevron.'
198. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1591 (1994)
(concluding that a statute exempting a "resource recovery facility" from regulation does not prevent
EPA from regulating the ash generated by such an incineration facility); PUD No. 1 v. Washington
Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct. 1900, 1921 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (insisting that the text of a
statute requires FERC to publish its reasons for failing to resolve inconsistencies with state agency
recommendations even when the state and federal agencies have no objections to each other's regula-
tions); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2229-30 (1994) (declaring that the word
"modify" means to change only partially, not to change fundamentally); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 322-25 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
term "foreign manufacture" can only mean manufactured outside the United States).
199. 827 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane).
200. Id. at 781.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 784.
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
204. Northern Natural Gas, 827 F.2d at 792-93.
205. The court may have proceeded to step two of the Chevron doctrine because of Panhandle E.
Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 613 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980), a pre-
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The issue in Northern Natural Gas involved the relationship of Sec-
tions Four, Five, and Seven of the Act. Sections Four and Five allow a
gas company or the Commission, respectively, to initiate a formal rate
proceeding to adjust rates that the company or FERC believes are no
longer "just and reasonable."' Given the volume of information neces-
sary for FERC to review a company's rates, rate proceedings pursuant to
Section Four or Five generally take approximately a year to complete.'
Section Seven addresses an entirely different issue: whether FERC should
allow a gas company to provide new service. The Act gives the Commis-
sion the "power to attach ... such reasonable terms and conditions [on a
Section Seven approval] as the public convenience and necessity may
require."28
The controversy in Northern Natural Gas arose because large indus-
trial users of natural gas frequently have the capability, known as dual-fuel
capacity, to switch to other fuels if the price of gas is too high.' If
these users switch off a gas company's system, the company will lose a
significant contribution these users provide to cover fixed costs shared with
other ratepayers. To avoid this, Northern Natural Gas sought approval of
a discount gas service for dual-fuel customers. 20  FERC agreed that it
was desirable to keep these customers on the gas system; in many cases,
the customers' decisions to leave the system would be inefficient and would
hurt the customers left on the system who would have to pay more to cover
the gas company's fixed costs.2" But FERC determined that simply ap-
proving the company's application to provide discount service at negotiated
rates would have allowed the company to doubly recover some of its fixed
Chevron case in which the circuit had conceded that "[tihe actual language of section 7(e) . . . con-
ceivably could authorize adjustment of rates not involved in the actual certificate proceeding." Id. at
1128. This dicta seemingly precluded the court from finding the statute clear regarding the legal issue
raised by the agency decision.
As courts presently apply Chevron, steps one and two are not always distinct. Both steps involve
some evaluation of whether the agency acted in a manner that the statutory scheme prohibited, and for
somejudges, both allow the reviewing court to consider policies behind statutory provisions. See Panel
Discussion, supra note 9, at 124, 126 (comments of Judge Stephen Williams) (suggesting that the
synthetic nature of the Chevron steps allows the courts to examine the policies underlying the statutory
provisions).
206. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1988).
207. See Jerome C. Muys, Federal Power Commission Allocation of Natural Gas Supply
Shortages: Prorationing, Priorities and Perplexity, 20 RocKY MTN. MIN.'L. INST. 301,327-30(1975)
(listing the numerous difficulties involved in gathering information for the Federal Power Commission).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1988).
209. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 27 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,299,
at 61,553 (1984).
210. Id.
211. See I ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
141 (1970) (explaining that price discrimination may be desirable from a social viewpoint).
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costs and thereby earn a higher-than-justified rate of return.1 To avoid
this outcome, FERC conditioned its approval of the discount service on the
company's crediting additional revenues generated by the new service to
reduce the rates of nondiscount ratepayers.
The court held this to be an impermissible condition on a Section
Seven certificate because it allowed the Commission to alter rates found at
one time to be "just and reasonable" without invoking the rate-setting
procedures of Section Five.2 14 The majority viewed the statute as requir-
ing the Commission to initiate a full-blown rate proceeding to adjust these
rates to prevent the company from recovering its expenses twice. 2 '5 The
court thus justified its decision by piecing together the various sections of
the Natural Gas Act as if Congress had carefully crafted their interplay.
The court failed, however, to acknowledge that the sections it tried to
fit so snugly together were aimed at very different concerns, and the court
cited no evidence that the enacting Congress had ever considered the
interplay between these sections. The majority also paid no heed to the
fact that the Act was written broadly to give the Federal Power Commis-
sion, now FERC, the authority to regulate natural gas rates effectively and
fairly. 21 6  It ignored the fact that Congress had neither altered the
provisions of the Act during more than a half-century of gas pipeline rate
regulation nor taken any other action that indicated an intent to micro-
manage pipeline rate regulation.217  Nor did the majority advert to the
fact that the enacting Congress would have had to have been ingeniously
prescient to foresee the issue before FERC in Northern Natural Gas
because when the statute was enacted, no customers utilized dual-fuel
technology.218  Most troubling, however, was that the Commission's
technical construction of the Act left FERC unable to implement the best
policy to avert double recovery by the petitioners.
212. Northern Natural Gas, 27 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at 61,554.
213. Id.
214. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 827 F.2d 779, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane).
215. Id. at 791-92.
216. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 400 U.S. 621, 631 (1972)
(noting that Congress "meant to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme" (quoting
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507, 520 (1947))); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 611 (1944) (describing the broad powers of regula-
tion granted to the Federal Power Commission).
217. Congress passed the Natural Gas Act in 1938. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821
(1938). In 1942, Congress did significantly amend Section Seven of the Natural Gas Act, governing
certificates of need for gas pipelines, but only to expand the Federal Power Commission's jurisdiction
to cover all interstate natural gas pipelines. Natural Gas Act, ch. 49, 56 Stat. 83, 83-84 (1942).
Otherwise, Congress has not changed Sections Four, Five, or Seven of the Act in any relevant way
since 1938.
218. See E.F. Searight et al., Interchangeability of High-BTU Oil Gases and Natural Gases, INST.
GAS TECH. REs. BULL., Jan. 1956, at I (noting the difficulties in developing dual-fuel burners in the
1950s).
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The Northern Natural Gas decision left the Commission with three
options in response to a company's petition for a new service, all of which
were inferior to the one FERC had sought to exercise. First, FERC could
refuse to grant the Section Seven certificate until the completion of a
Section Five general rate proceeding to adjust rates to account for the
ultimate approval of the certificate. This would require FERC to devote
a great amount of administrative resources to Section Seven applications
that raised the potential of double cost recovery, which in many instances
would be wasteful. More significantly, it would delay approval of the
certificate until the Section Five proceeding was complete, during which
time many large users would have switched to other fuels. 2 19 The loss
of gas purchases by large customers would be bad for the company. It
would also hurt both the large user, forced to switch to a less desirable
fuel, and the other ratepayers, left with a greater bill due to a shrinking
user base to cover the same fixed costs.' Second, FERC could order
the company to set the rates for the Section Seven service low enough to
prevent the company from reaping windfall profits. But this strategy could
create inefficient distortions in users' decisions whether to remain on the
gas system." Other customers would also perceive it as unfair, given
that it would allow the large user with alternative fuel flexibility to avoid
having to contribute to the capital costs of the gas pipeline system.'
FERC's third option would be to allow the company to retain the double
recovery of capital costs until FERC could find the time and resources to
alter the company's rates for other services in a Section Five proceeding.
The active approach in Northern Natural Gas thus precluded a wise
policy choice by FERC due to a highly technical reading of the structure
of the Natural Gas Act. It is common for courts to apply a literal method
of statutory interpretation because this method saves them from having to
make tough policy choices and allows judges to engage in legal inquiries
with which they are comfortable. Unfortunately, the method also increases
the likelihood of statutory interpretation that subverts good agency
policysetting.
219. The Supreme Court relied on the need to avoid this delay to allow the Federal Power
Commission to set rates for a new service under Section Seven without first determining that the rates
are just and reasonable. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 389 (1959).
220. See STEPHEN BRBYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 54 (1982) (describing how price
discrimination to keep customers on a utility system can benefit all customers and society generally);
KAHN, supra note 211, at 141-42.
221. Setting prices at different levels above marginal cost for different gas customers can lead to
inefficiencies by distorting secondary markets-that is, by giving the receiver of the discounted price
an advantage over competitors who shoulder a greater portion of the costs in excess of marginal cost.
See KAHN,supra note 211, at 168-71.
222. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 827 F.2d 779, 798 (D.C. Cir., 1987) (Wald, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that consumers "of existing services," having no choice but to use natural gas,
are forced to "bear all of the pipeline's fixed costs").
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I. A Deliberative Alternative: Emphasizing Chevron's Second Step
The foregoing examination of the theoretical roots of Chevron suggests
that the deferential approach fails because it implements pluralistic theory,
which subjects agency interpretations of statutes to influences of an
imperfect and impoverished political process. At the same time, the
examination suggests that the active approach falls victim to the unrealistic
assumptions made by the transmission-belt and expertise models-that
agency interpretations are driven by congressional will or agency expertise
respectively. These assumptions, in turn, lead courts sometimes to impose
their own policy preferences and other times to abdicate their responsibility
to prevent runaway agency decisionmaking. To resolve this conundrum,
we must seek a different theoretical conception of the role of government
and more particularly of the administrative state.
A. Deliberative Democracy as an Alternative to the Pluralistic Vision of
the Administrative State
Some scholars have recently turned to political theory's republican
revival for a more satisfactory conception of bureaucratic government.'m
This underlying theory of government, which here I label "deliberative
democracy, " ' views politics as a process by which members of society
seek both to define the public interest and to determine the best way to
further that interest.' According to this theory, the political process,
rather than merely performing the pluralistic role of registering pre-political
private preferences, should also transform private values in an attempt to
reach consensus about the public interest.'m The theory advises that
citizens should participate in the political process with an open mind and
be willing to change their policy preferences in response to discourse with
223. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1541-43 (hailing administrative agencies as the only
institutions capable of fulfilling the civic republican ideal); Sunstein, supra note 77, at 59-64 (discuss-
ing factions and their impact on administrative law). For a more general discussion of the republican
revival in legal theory, see Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
224. Elsewhere I have used the label "civic republicanism" for this political theory. Seidenfeld,
supra note 15, at 1528-33. I believe, however, that a reference to republicanism inappropriately
suggests a tension between this political theory and liberal theory. In fact, deliberative democracy
borrows heavily from liberal as well as republican philosophy. See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1567,
1567-68 (describing the tension between liberal and republican thought as "false" and noting that some
liberal and republican elements are "highly congenial").
225. See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1548-49 (describing the procedures by which civic
republicans might use collective discussion and debate to determine preferences and entitlements in
society).
226. See Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal 77Teory and the
MoralFoundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REv. 329,357 (1994) (pointing out that the
various theories of deliberative democracy share the belief that people can change their personal
preferences through dialogue with others); Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1554-55 (describing the way
in which compromises are reached through deliberation).
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individuals with diverse interests. 7 Although universal consensus is not
feasible, the hope of deliberative democracy is that its value-altering
process will enable society to come close enough to achieving consensus
that the legal rules the process generates will be less coercive than those
that would result from the operation of pluralism's political market-
place.m
Open discourse and a deliberative political process thus play key roles
in the deliberative democracy conception of government. To be legitimate,
government decisions must pay equal respect to the concerns of all indivi-
duals. ' 9 The values and aspirations of all members of society must be
represented in the debate that not only defines the public interest but also
ultimately justifies government action to further that interest. '  The
political process, at the least, must attempt to persuade those affected by
government action of the need for such action, with the hope that all
affected will accept the action in light of the concerns of all citizens. t1
For these reasons, before the state uses its coercive power-adopting
binding rules or enforcing those rules within particular contexts-it must
listen to the arguments by representatives of the affected interest groups
and must explain how its use of such power furthers the public interest
given social, political, and economic circumstances. 32
The administrative bureaucracy plays an essential role in at least some
versions of deliberative democratic theory. The structure of agencies
allows for public participation, political influence, and reasoned decision-
making as part of the regulatory discourse. In fact, the administrative
"branch" of government may hold the greatest promise for implementing
the deliberative democratic ideal. ' 3  Deliberative democratic theory,
227. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 135-36 (1993) (emphasizing the necessity
for participationby all groups in society); Galston, supra note226, at 361-62 ("Deliberative democracy
can never be a reality unless people are willing to enter into the public dialogue in the first place.").
228. Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1539; see also Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1550 (noting that
pluralism often results in intimidation, manipulation, and disparities in political influence).
229. Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1531; see Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1552 (suggesting that
political outcomes should be supported by a consensus among a politically equal citizenry); see also
Michelman, supra note 146, at 1531 (asserting that civic republicanism's dialogic, critical-
transformative dimension cannot take place without the stimulation provided by the views of those at
the margins of society).
230. Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1530; see SUNSTMIN, supra note 162, at 212-14 (stressing that
the interests of regulatory beneficiaries are no less important than those of regulated entities). Thus,
deliberative democracy must include in the political discourse "persons who, at many historical
moments, could not count themselves heirs to traditions whose meanings... involve the exclusion or
subordination of just those persons." Michelman, supra note 146, at 1496.
231. See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1544, 1544-45 (noting that legislators and other political
actors in a deliberative democracy must "justify their choices by appealing to a broader public good"
in order to successfully implement such legislation).
232. Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1530.
233. I have elaborated my reasons for this belief in detail in Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1541-62.
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however, also suggests the need for certain changes in the manner in which
the federal government makes and enforces law, and achievement of that
ideal still requires some restructuring of the administrative state. The three
constitutionally specified branches of government must reconceptualize
their relationships to administrative agencies to ensure the proper balance
between political responsiveness and reasoned decisionmaking. Review of
statutory interpretation represents a major arena in which the judiciary
interacts with agencies, and deliberative democracy demands some revamp-
ing of the Chevron doctrine as one means of ensuring that agencies act
deliberatively yet remain politically accountable.
B. Deliberative Democracy and a Syncopated Chevron
To retain the benefits of an administrative decisionmaking process
geared toward broad public participation in regulatory debate influenced by
agency expertise and political accountability, deliberative democracy
counsels placing primary responsibility for statutory interpretation in the
administrative agency. But, to ensure deliberative decisionmaking, as well
as to avoid excessive special interest influence and agency capture, courts
must retain the authority to review agency interpretations in a meaningful
manner. This need suggests a modification of Chevron that retains the
two-step paradigm but emphasizes the second step rather than the first.
1. The agency as primary interpreter and Chevron's step one.-
Recognizing the agency as the primary interpreter of statutes implies that
the deferential approach to Chevron's step one is appropriate under de-
liberative democracy. The active approach allows too much leeway for a
reviewing court to find support for its preferred interpretation in the
legislative history and to parlay that support into "clear" meaning.'
Deliberative democracy does not condone the propensity of active courts
to substitute their policy judgments for those of the agency by creative
statutory interpretation.
Nonetheless, courts must overrule agency interpretations that contra-
vene the clear dictates of a statute that addresses the precise question
confronting the agency. Congressional override of agency policy provides
an important means of ensuring that agency policysetting remains true to
the polity's notions of the public interest 35 In other words, in those
234. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 308 (citing "creative" statutory interpretation and the "teasing"
of meaning from ambiguous legislative history as ways in which courts find "support" for their inter-
pretations); Silberman, supra note 40, at 827 (bemoaning thejudiciary's ability to express dislike for
or allegiance with congressional policy under the rubric of "recourse to the purpose of the statute").
235. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1551 (noting that congressional review of agency decision-
making prevents agencies from straying too far from the "consensus of the common good").
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instances when Congress musters the energy explicitly to constrain an
agency on a precise policy decision, deliberative democracy requires a
mechanism to enforce that constraint. Leaving to the agency unfettered
discretion to interpret a statute that is meant to limit the agency's discretion
invites abuse; the agency has a strong incentive to construe the statute
narrowly and thereby to avoid the constraint Congress intended. 6
I In short, deliberative democracy suggests that a court should find a
statute silent or ambiguous under Chevron's step one unless the statute
clearly manifests congressional intent to constrain agency discretion, as
opposed to merely providing guidance on the substantive regulatory issues
the statute addresses. When a reviewing court determines that Congress
drafted a statutory provision to constrain directly agency policymaking, the
court should retain primary responsibility for interpreting the statute. In
such a case, the court should not defer to the agency even if the statute is
silent or ambiguous on the precise issue before the agency, as the legis-
lation would evidence a meta-intent that the courts, and not the agency,
decide issues of law. 7
2. Taking a hard look under Chevron's step two.-Having left most
questions of statutory interpretation to the agency via a deferential approach
to step one, courts must not abdicate their role of reviewing agency deter-
minations of law. Viewed from the perspective of deliberative democracy,
the problem is one of providing meaningful judicial review while not
allowing the court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. This
precise problem, however, has been addressed by courts reviewing agency
reasoning and explicit policy choices under the APA's arbitrary and
capricious standard." In that context, the D.C. Circuit created the
"hard look" test, 9 which asks courts to steep themselves in agency
236. To borrow from Cass Sunstein, granting agencies such unfettered discretion is like having
"foxes... guard henhouses." Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 368 (comments of Cass Sunstein).
237. In determining whether Congress intended directly to constrain the agency in adopting legisla-
tion, it may sometimes be appropriate for the reviewing court to look at the legislative history. This
is so because Congress rarely includes explicit statutory instructions on the meta-question of which
institution should interpret the statute. For example, legislative history may indicate that Congress
amended a statute in direct response to an agency decision, but the language of the amendment might
not include that information. In such a case, the court should construe the amendment and should not
defer to the agency.
238. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 177,
183 (tying the hard look test under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to deliberative
democracy); cf. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. Rsv. 577, 653 (1993)
(arguing that the purpose of hard look review should be to create a dialogue between courts and
agencies).
239. Judge Leventhal first announced the test in a case involving substantial evidence review of
an FCC licensing. See Greater BostonTelevision Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The D.C. Circuit has since adopted the test for the review of
informal rulemaking under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
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policy and the substantive debate framing the issue under consideration to
ensure that the agency below gave a "hard look" to all factors relevant to
its decision.' Substituting something akin to hard look review for the
deferential reasonableness standard that courts have used in Chevron's step
two would go far toward implementing the deliberative model." 1
Step two in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretation would
differ from traditional hard look review because the statute binds the
agency as well as the courts and, hence, constrains the agency's policy
choices. Thus, in reviewing an agency's interpretation, courts should
require the agency to identify the concerns that the statute addresses and
explain how the agency's interpretation took those concerns into account.
In addition, the agency should explain why it emphasized certain interests
instead of others. In other words, the agency must reveal what led it to
balance the statutory aims as it did. The agency should also respond to any
likely contentions that its interpretation will have deleterious implications.
In short, to satisfy the second step of the syncopated Chevron, the agency
should explain why its interpretation is good policy in light of the purposes
and concerns underlying the statutory scheme.'
F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding EPA regulation of sulphur dioxideunderthe Clean Air Act
after an exhaustive hard look analysis); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-36 & n.75 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (describing the standard set out in Greater Boston Television and applying that standard to uphold
EPA's regulation of lead as a fuel additive under the Clean Air Act), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976). The Supreme Court has applied something akin to hard look review to informal agency
decisionmakingwithout invoking the talismanic phrase. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983) (reversing an agency's rescission of a passive
restraint requirement due to an inadequate consideration of alternatives); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (reversing approval of a highway through a city park
for failure to consider all relevant factors).
240. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416; Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1499-
1500 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at
851.
241. The relationship between the hard look doctrine and deliberative democracy was first noted
in Sunstein, supra note 77, at 60-61.
242. Traditional hard look review mandates that agencies give detailed explanations for their
decisions, including reasons for rejecting all reasonable alternatives. See, e.g., Brae Corp. v. United
States, 740 F.2d 1023, 1039, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reversing and remanding part of an ICC rule due
to the lack of explanation for that part of the rule), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1069 (1985); Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(requiring that an agency provide a "reasoned analysis" whenever it chooses to depart from prior
policies). The rigorous review of agency interpretations that I proposethus differs from traditional hard
look review in its demand that agencies tie their decision to acknowledged statutory goals. Cf
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 192-96 (1990) (advocating "harder-look" review in
which courts would demand that agencies openly explain their resort to politics to answer questions left
open by other paradigms, such as law and expertise). I would also advocate that courts apply this
rigorous review pragmatically to avoid the ossification of regulation that some have blamed on hard
look review. Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1570 n.289. For a discussion of the potential deleterious
effects of hard look review on regulation, see Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and
Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 315 (1987) (noting that
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At step two, the courts should employ traditional tools of construction.
Although legislative debate will rarely evidence a universally shared
understanding of statutory meaning, frequently it will reveal the concerns
of the various interest groups in the enacting coalition. A statute's
legislative history can thereby provide judges with insights into the policy
choices entailed by interpretation. Likewise, canons of construction often
reflect policy considerations that go beyond the question of interpreting any
particular statute-considerations such as institutional competence and
maintaining checks and balances that characterize our constitutional
democracy. Any discourse about the policy implications of a statute's
meaning would be incomplete if it failed to factor in such overarching
considerations.
Active statutory construction at step two does not pose a great threat
of judicial usurpation of the agency's policysetting role because this
approach merely subjects the agency's interpretation to more exacting
scrutiny. If the reviewing court finds that the agency ignored an important
purpose of the statute or that the agency failed to balance the statutory
concerns with the- public interest in mind, then it should remand the
decision to the agency rather than interpret the statute itself. The agency
then has another opportunity to interpret the statute. The agency remains
free to maintain its original interpretation and provide better support and
reasoning for it or modify its interpretation in response to the concerns
raised by the court. In this way, the review process would create "a
meaningful dialogue between court and agency in which the court stands
in for the knowledgeable citizen that the agency must persuade to accept
[its] regulatory policy. ' 2 3
3. The syncopated Chevron applied.-To illustrate how the synco-
pated Chevron suggested by deliberative democracy might operate, I will
hard look reviews invite overcorrection and paralysis in all agencies); Pierce, The Role of the Judiciary,
supra note 13, at 1263-64 ("The uncertainty surrounding the reasonableness requirement can lead
agencies to commit vast resources to a single policymaking initiative."); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas
0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 9 & n.48 (1989) (noting that agencies are required to devote significant resources to justify their
opinions).
243. Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1550; cf. Friedman, supra note 238, at 655-58 (describing how
judicial review focuses and facilitates a political dialogue about constitutional issues). This approach
to review leads to the possibility of a standoff between the court and the agency. However, I do not
believe that such standoffs would occur frequently. Agencies tend to want to avoid the devotion of
resources and the embarrassment caused by judicial reversal. Reviewing courts also tend to be more
reserved if the agency sticks to its guns after an initial reversal. In those instances when a standoff
does result, Congress could step in to resolve the issue. Although Congress may not be capable of
providing sufficient oversight to provide the primary means of monitoring everyday agency decisions,
it is capable of oversight and response to infrequent salient controversies, and the very fact that the
standoffoccurred would tend to make the issues involved politically salient. See Friedman, supra note
238, at 656-57 (noting how a judicial decision can make "some previous dormant issue important").
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reconsider Rust and Northern Natural Gas. In Rust, the precise issue
facing the agency was the extent to which federally subsidized family-
planning programs could provide nondirective abortion counseling.
2 4
The statute was silent on this question and gave no indication of how
Congress intended HHS to balance the interest in not having the federal
government subsidize abortion against other statutory interests such as
decreasing the health risks related to contraception, pregnancy, and
childbirth. As the Supreme Court's opinion makes clear, the legislative
history provides evidence that a reviewing court could use either to allow
or to prohibit nondirective counseling.' " Hence, the Court was correct
to let the agency decide the issue in the first instance.
HHS, however, failed to explain how its interpretation responded to
many of the policy concerns raised by the comments filed in the rule-
making proceeding. For example, the Department did not elucidate how
its interpretation would affect the risks facing poor pregnant women who
eventually choose abortion. Likewise, it did not indicate the cost, if any,
of the previous policy of allowing nondirective counseling. The only
discussion of policy considerations concerned anecdotal evidence of
coercive counseling and other counseling abuses.' Yet, the agency
never estimated the extent of such abuses. In addition, the agency failed
to explain why a more focused approach, such as cutting off funds for Title
X programs that engaged in coercive or directive counseling, would not
have been an adequate solution. In contrast, the review I suggest for
Chevron's step two would have required a remand by the court in order to
give the agency an opportunity to respond to these criticisms and to
reconsider its interpretation in light of them.
Supporters of Rust might respond that the agency decision was a
political choice reflecting HHS's perception of attitudes about abortion.
But this is precisely the type of rationalization that deliberative democracy
deems invalid. Under the deliberative model, an agency cannot justify its
action merely by asserting that it was done to appease political pressure
from an interest group. If the action constitutes a direct benefit accorded
to a particular interest group, the agency must explain why that benefit is
good public policy in light of the statutory objectives. Such an explanation
will at least help focus legal and political oversight of the agency action.
For example, in Rust, HHS might have set forth its motivation more can-
didly and admitted that its action reflected a desire to discourage abortion.
Such an explanation, however, would have made the decision far more sus-
pect as a matter of statutory interpretation and constitutional law, while
244. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-81 (1991).
245. Id. at 189.
246. Id. at 187.
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potentially subjecting the agency to greater political criticism, which might
even have allowed Congress to succeed in its failed attempt to override the
gag rule.2 7
In Northern Natural Gas, the issue facing the agency was whether
FERC could require a gas company to lower its rates on existing service
as a condition for certification of new service.' Again, the reviewing
court correctly found the statute silent under step one.'"9 The Natural
Gas Act entirely fails to address the relationship between existing rates and
the provision of new service.
Unlike the Supreme Court in Rust, the D.C. Circuit in Northern
Natural Gas applied a fairly rigorous analysis at step two and reversed
FERC. The court deviated from the syncopated Chevron approach, how-
ever, because it failed to ask the correct questions. The court addressed
the structure of the statute and how its provisions had been applied in other
nonanalogous contexts to discern the limits of the Natural Gas Act's grant
of authority to the agency to place conditions on certificates for new
service.' The court essentially applied an analysis similar to that which
an active court uses at step one but did so at Chevron's second step. Most
significantly, the court altogether ignored the policy implications of its
interpretation.
As was intimated earlier, FERC's interpretation was reasonable in
light of the agency's concerns about efficiency and the desire to prevent a
substantial windfall to the gas company. Under the approach suggested
here, it would have been difficult for a court to reverse the agency decision
as unreasonable. But, even if FERC had not persuaded the court that its
interpretation struck a reasonable balance of the statute's goals in an
attempt to further the public interest, under a syncopated Chevron the court
should have remanded the case to the agency. Given another opportunity
to explain itself, the agency could have explained the fundamental nature
of the prohibition against double cost recovery and emphasized the ramifi-
cations of the court's denial to FERC of a means to prevent such recovery.
IV. Evaluation of the Syncopated Chevron
Deliberative democratic theory thus suggests that courts should review
agency interpretations of statutes using a two-step analysis under which
courts would leave most decisions to the agencies authorized to implement
the statutes, but would demand that the agencies provide persuasive reason-
ing for their interpretations. This analysis holds the promise of respecting
247. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
248. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 827 F.2d 779, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
249. Id. at 784.
250. Id. at 789-93.
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the policy choices of the more expert and accountable agencies and simul-
taneously providing judicial restraints against special interest decision-
making. The question remains, however, whether a syncopated Chevron
is likely to fulfill this promise without creating greater evils in the process.
A. The Potential Evils of an Expanded Agency Role in Statutory
Interpretation
The syncopated Chevron would leave more questions of statutory
interpretation, in the first instance, to agencies. This approach frowns
upon courts using traditional tools of statutory construction to remove
questions of law from agency discretion. Hence, at step one, this approach
grants at least as much authority to agencies as the existing deferential
approach under Chevron. The rationale for giving interpretive authority
to agencies under the deliberative model might even justify greater reliance
on agency interpretation than does the pluralistic rationale underlying
Chevron. According to deliberative democracy, agencies, rather than
courts, should have primary interpretive authority not only because of their
superior expertise and greater political accountability but also because
agency decisionmaking processes are geared toward more meaningful inter-
est group discourse. 51 Hence, agency statutory interpretation is prefer-
able because it is more likely to reflect a politically determined public
interest than is judicial statutory interpretation.
Therefore, the deliberative democratic ideal would counsel courts to
grant agencies primary interpretive authority even when courts would not
do so under existing doctrine. For example, some Supreme Court opinions
have intimated that Chevron applies only when Congress has delegated to
the agency authority to make binding legal prescriptions? 2 This makes
sense under pluralistic theory because agencies without such authority
cannot be held responsible for the implementation of the statute, and
interest groups will have to secure their political deals outside of the
administrative arena. Deliberative democracy, however, would counsel
granting the agency primary interpretive authority, even though the agency
has only an indirect role in administering the statute, so long as the agency
251. Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1542.
252. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 152-53
(1991) (noting that the Secretary of Labor and not OSHRC should be given deference because the
Secretary has lawmaking authority while OSHRC merely adjudicates disputes under the statute); Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (holding that Chevron is not applicable when the
"[j]udiciary and not the [agency is] the adjudicator of private rights of action arising under the
statute"); see also Anthony, supra note 12, at 42 ("Courts should defer under Chevron only when
Congress has authorized the agency to issue interpretations with the force of law in [thelformat [that
the agency used]." (emphasis in original)); Weaver, supra note 17, at 595 (arguing that the Martin
Court's focus on agencies' lawmaking authority "suggests a significant limitation on Chevron's scope").
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procedures encourage discourse about the implications of potential interpre-
tations.
Such an expansion of agency responsibility might increase the potential
for abuse of discretion by agencies. This danger is of particular concern
because statutory dictates provide a crucial mechanism whereby Congress
influences government policy. Hence, an expanded agency role in the
interpretive process is acceptable only if it does not compromise Congress's
ability ultimately to control policy by statutory command.' This threat
in turn calls for institutional checks on agencies' statutory interpretation
adequate to prevent an agency from pursuing special interests or its own
idiosyncratic notion of the public good.'
The most obvious check can be provided by the more rigorous judicial
review at step two of the syncopated approach. Requiring the agency to
justify its interpretation in terms of the goals underlying the statute will
make the agency think twice before pursuing a special interest agenda.
Cynics might object that this reasoned decisionmaking requirement will not
constrain the agency's discretion at all, but will merely cause the agency
to fabricate an elaborate justification for the same interpretation the agency
would have made without the requirement.' 5  For them, a rigorous
second step would add administrative costs to regulation without any
concomitant benefits.
These cynics, however, underestimate the values of a reasoned deci-
sionmaking requirement. First, they assume that agencies will always
concoct reasons to explain decisions already made on other grounds. But
agencies frequently act in good faith and respond to the findings of their
own reasoned analyses by altering their decisions and even their decision-
making structures.' The problem is getting an agency to analyze
253. Although I have argued that Congress is too inefficient and nondeliberative to set day-to-day
policy via statutory enactments, Congress must still retain the ability to set policy by this mechanism
when it is capable of acting. Ultimately, the democratic nature of our government does depend on
Congress having this power. Within the deliberative democratic model of the administrative state, this
power is crucial for Congress to fulfill its role of monitoring agency policysetting and correcting
policies that Congress finds politically unacceptable.
254. See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSrRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 16-21
(1981) (describing various mechanisms that industries use to "capture" agencies); Michael E. Levine
& Jennifer J. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORo. 167, 174-78 (1990) (special issue) (distinguishing capture by private
interest groups from regulators' use of the agency to pursue their own conception of the public good).
255. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to 'Hard Look" Review, 1989
DUKE L.J. 538, 540 (arguing that agencies will respond to heightened scrutiny by creating explanations
of their conduct rather than changing their conduct); cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 35, at 152 (arguing that
"synoptic"-hard look-review encourages agencies to choose alternatives that are easiest to defend
rather than those the agency deems best); Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 428-29 (1981) ("[Comprehensiverationality merely masks the decision-
maker's private biases under a legitimizing facade of objectivity and analytic rigor.").
256. See MELNICK, supra note 191, at 379 ("EPA officials speak highly of the courts precisely
because court decisions have played such a major role in shaping the agency's structure, strategy, and
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thoroughly its interpretation of a statute. For most agency decisions, the
type of policy analysis suggested by step two of the syncopated Chevron
occurs when the technical staff in the program office responsible for an
agency decision reports its recommendations to its director. After that, the
agency will usually not perform a policy review unless the courts subject
the agency reasoning to meaningful judicial review. 7 For questions of
statutory meaning, the decision may never reflect the input of the technical
staff, as the statutory interpretation may come from the agency's counsel
rather than a program office. Hence, rigorous judicial review may provide
the only impetus for the agency to consider comprehensively the policy
implications of a proposed interpretation.
Second, a reasoned decisionmaking requirement may prevent an agen-
cy from attempting to justify a decision it has already made on unaccept-
able grounds. An agency's explanation of the reasoning behind its decision
will often appear implausible absent candor;258 hence, an agency inter-
pretation supported by post hoc rationalization stands a good chance of
being remanded by the reviewing court. For example, had HHS genuinely
tried to justify its ban on nondirective abortion counseling as a matter of
policy, instead of by an appeal to a fictitious statutory intent, the agency
would have been forced to concede that its actual basis was a desire to
discourage abortions. But such a desire is well beyond the legislative
purpose of avoiding state-subsidized abortions or abortion counseling.
Because HHS never explained why it believed discouraging abortions was
good policy, under the syncopated Chevron the ban would have been re-
manded to the agency for further justification. 9
The reasoned decisionmaking requirement provides yet a third con-
straint on agency statutory interpretations. Even if an agency wishes to
pursue its own agenda or appease a special interest group and believes it
sense of mission."); Richard B. Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and Quasi-Constitutional
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons From the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA
L. REV. 713, 731-32 (1977) (asserting that the requirement that EPA "explain in detail the bases for
its decision [has] contributed significantly to the improvement of EPA decisionmaking"); Sunstein,
supra note 34, at 471 (noting that "Itihe requirement of detailed explanation has been a powerful
impediment to arbitrary or improperly motivated... decisions"). Such a good faith response to the
hard look requirement "strengthens both analytic processes and accountability to superiors within
agencies." Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 527 (emphasis in original).
257. See Villiam F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
59-60 (1975). For statutory interpretation made as part of a rule with significant economic impact, the
agency may perform a policy analysis in preparing the regulatory impact analysis required by OMB
regulatory review. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735, 51,741 (1993).
258. Garland, supra note 32, at 554-55.
259. In Rust, an admission by HHS that its true goal was the outright discouraging of abortion
might have resulted in invalidation of the gag rule on constitutional grounds. Such an admission
amounts to clear evidence of government intent to discourage the exercise of a fundamental right.
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would escape judicial remand, its justification for its interpretation might
force the agency to reveal its goals to the electorate.' For example,
even if the Supreme Court accepted a more candid HHS explanation of the
ban on nondirective counseling, that explanation might have increased the
saliency of the decision and, hence, popular dissatisfaction with the HHS
interpretation. An agency seeking to avoid political disapproval might
moderate its interpretation to conform more closely to a position with
broad public support."1
In addition to meaningful judicial review, congressional oversight
remains a significant check on agency discretion in interpreting statutes.
Compared to the traditional alternatives that place the ultimate authority for
statutory interpretation in the courts, the syncopated Chevron gives
Congress greater control over the interpretive process. Congress must
explicitly pass overriding substantive legislation to reverse any judicial
interpretation that it finds unacceptable. The burdensome nature of the
congressional committee system along with the Constitution's requirements
of bicameralism and presentment renders this method of control over statu-
tory policy unreliable. 2
Congress, however, retains greater controls over agency action than
it does over judicial decisionmaking.' Using the power of the purse,
Congress can cajole agencies or, alternatively, threaten their appropria-
tions.' In extreme cases, an agency policy could jeopardize the like-
lihood of Senate confirmation if the President reappoints the agency head
at the end of her term. Even the active judicial role at step two of the
syncopated Chevron might increase Congress's control over some agency
decisions; if courts and an agency reach an impasse over the meaning of
a particular statute, the resulting media attention and public reaction could
give Congress the impetus it needs to overcome the inertia of the legislative
process. In short, the increased agency authority under the syncopated
approach is not likely to facilitate agency pursuit of special interest or
idiosyncratic aims. Rather, given the more meaningful judicial review of
step two, this approach should actually decrease the likelihood of such
pursuit.
260. According to Sunstein, the "technocratic rationality" required by hard look review aims "to
ensure that the relevant considerations are opened up to public scrutiny." Sunstein, supra note 238,
at 188.
261. Essentially, judicial remand reduces the cost of discovering what the agency is doing and
hence facilitates reaction from the more diffused interest groups apt to oppose a special interest interpre-
tation. Macey, supra note 125, at 256.
262. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
263. See Seidenfeld, supra note 15, at 1551-54; Silberman, supra note 40, at 824 (both noting
that Congress has considerable control over agency decisionmaking).
264. STRAUSS, supra note 17, at 55-56.
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B. Potential Evils of Rigorous Review Applied to Agency Statutory
Interpretation
A second potential evil of a syncopated Chevron is the threat that
rigorous review at step two will allow courts too much leeway to interfere
with agency policy.' This concern, however, must be tempered by a
recognition that courts have traditionally retained ultimate control over the
interpretation of statutes.' Moreover, even under Chevron, the control
courts retain threatens greater interference with agency policy than does
court control under the syncopated approach.
Unlike traditional models of the relationship between agencies and
courts, deliberative democratic theory does not necessarily view courts as
the ultimate interpreters of statutes. 7 Under this theory's operative
doctrine of statutory construction-the syncopated Chevron-the court does
not retain authority to make a definitive interpretation of a statute
administered by an agency except in those few instances in which the
statute reveals an explicit answer to the precise question before the agency
or otherwise indicates that the court and not the agency is to interpret the
statute. The most a reviewing court can do is remand the decision to the
agency. The agency has just as much power to resist a reviewing court's
interpretation-by construing the statute on remand as it did originally-as
the court has to resist the agency interpretation by repeated reversal and
remand. Hence, compared to traditional notions of the judicial role in
statutory interpretation, the syncopated Chevron limits the power of
reviewing courts to interfere with agency policy via creative construction
of statutory provisions.
Even compared to Chevron as presently applied, the syncopated ap-
proach may provide greater constraints on judicial interference with agency
265. See Strauss, supra note 255, at 549 (arguing that too much judicial oversight of agency action
causes agencies to devote resources to explaining decisions rather than making decisions). Critics of
aggressive judicial review charge that such judicial intervention imposes arbitrary and uncoordinated
requirements on agency policysetting, which in turn threaten to paralyze agency regulatory and enforce-
ment activity. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
225 (1990) ("The result of judicial requirements for comprehensive rationality has been a general
suppression of the use of rules."); MELNICK, supra note 191, at 360-87 (describing the numerous
adverse and unintended consequences of judicial oversight of air pollution regulation); JOHN M.
MENDELoFF, THE DILEMMA OF ToXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CAUSES
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policy. Under Chevron's step one, some courts feel free to overturn an
agency interpretation of a statute even when the statute appears to give the
agency broad discretion to implement its policies. The syncopated
Chevron, however, would clarify that courts are not to reach out at step
one to overturn policy-driven agency readings of statutes. Thus, because
the syncopated approach limits courts to remanding agency interpretations
and clarifies that the courts are not to impose their preferred interpretations
on agencies, it provides ample protection against judicially chosen policy.
V. Conclusion
Ten years ago the Supreme Court decided Chevron, dramatically alter-
ing the customary method of judicial review of agency statutory inter-
pretation. Chevron reflects the concerns pluralistic democratic theory
raised about more traditional models of the administrative state; in
particular, it rejects the notions that agencies exist only to implement
congressional will and that agency decisionmaking merely applies objective
expertise to resolve technical regulatory problems. Instead, Chevron views
agencies as institutions that possess expertise and remain politically
accountable and, thus, as prime candidates for resolving the tough political
questions often raised by disputes over statutory interpretation. Chevron,
therefore, instructs reviewing courts to defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of statutes unless Congress has provided clear direction on
the precise issue befori the agency.
Unfortunately, pluralistic theory, on which Chevron implicitly rests,
has its own shortcomings. The "political marketplace" that the theory
sanctifies encourages government regulation to benefit special interests;
such regulation can be both inefficient and unfair to those without access
to power in society. Recently, scholars have proposed an alternative to
pluralistic theory-deliberative democracy-which seeks to ensure that
government pursues the public interest and simultaneously allows govern-
ment a broader role in influencing how the polity defines that public
interest. Deliberative democratic theory suggests a revamping of Chevron.
An agency should have primary authority to interpret statutes that it
administers, but must persuasively explain its interpretation of those
statutes. This approach will allow agencies to use their expertise, political
accountability, and deliberative decisionmaking processes to ensure that
statutes are interpreted to implement policy wisely, without encouraging
agencies to interpret statutes to benefit powerful special interest groups or
to further the agencies' own idiosyncratic notions of the public interest.
